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Abstract

The Post-Cold War began an era of decline in the nuclear enterprise. Leaders
were risk-averse in fear of being fired for making mistakes, the nuclear culture lost its
experts, organizations were drawn to the conventional fight, and training and education
lacked the priority necessary to rebuild the nuclear enterprise. In 2007 and 2008 two
major incidents occurred, a necessary evil to bring focus and priority back to the nuclear
enterprise. Several reports were accomplished to identify the issues and make
recommendations. Some recommendations are successful and some are failures.
The purpose of this paper is identify the successful traits in the process to improve
it for follow-on recommendations. Once the basic process was identified, a method was
applied to formalize it. The method used for this research paper is critical success factors
for the implementation and key performance indicators for assessment. Even though a
process and method is identified to ensure the success of an implementation, if not
properly followed the chances of success drastically decrease. If the organization
identifies the wrong critical success factors or does not continually assess key
performance indicators the implemented program will likely fail.
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Improving the Nuclear Reform Implementation for Success
I. Introduction
“With the end of the Cold War, and the sharply reduced likelihood of a nuclear
exchange, awareness of the role and power of nuclear weapons has diminished. But their
power and uniqueness endure—and must again be clearly understood if they are to play
their crucial role in nuclear deterrence.”
-James Schlesinger

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the nuclear mission was the priority of the
United States (U.S.) in order to safeguard itself against the Soviet Union. Then Post-Cold
War, the U.S. decided to shift its focus to conventional operations, allowing the nuclear
mission to go into hibernation. In 2007 and 2008, two significant events occurred that
challenged the credibility of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. These events prompted DoD to
take a serious look at the nuclear enterprise and implement some major changes.
Department of Defense stood-up Air Force Global Strike Command, created Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (Headquarter Air Force A10), and the restructured the
education and training programs. Just as the nuclear enterprise started to gain some
momentum it nearly lost its effectiveness in 2014 when the cheating scandals in both the
U.S. Air Force and Navy shocked the nation. Due to these setbacks it is more important
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than ever to ensure the nuclear reform implementations are successful to maintain the
credibility of the nuclear enterprise.
The purpose of this research is to recommend a process for nuclear reform
recommendations to be implemented successfully, to include sustainment of the
organization or program after it is fully operational. First, using the decision making
process, we will start with how an issue becomes a recommendation and then becomes
implemented. Before the implementation becomes operational, a series of steps will have
to be accomplished to ensure its success. The first five steps, described in Chapter 3, will
be accomplished using the Critical Success Factor (CSF) method. The CSFs are the few
key areas where “things must go right” in order for an organization to succeed (Bullen
and Rockart 1981). Once the CSFs have been achieved the organization or program is on
its way to a successful start. At this point the organization or implementation is ready to
become fully operational. Once fully operational, the organization or program needs to be
continually assessed to ensure it remains successful. Key performance indicators (KPIs),
a five step process, are the measurable values used to ensure the organization is achieving
its key goals (Lorette 2016).
The appropriate plan allows an organization to successfully implement a
recommendation and sustain it. Several well-known reports such as the Welch-Harvey
Report, Schlesinger Report, Creedon-Fanta Report, and others, have highlighted issues
2

within the nuclear enterprise. Lefort, McMurray and Tesvic (2015) surveyed over 2,200
executives in 900 companies and found that the elements that have the greatest bearing
on successful implementation of change are ownership and commitment, prioritization,
and sufficient resources and capabilities. The Welch-Harvey Report also discovered the
disconnect between ownership, passion, and dedication had a negative effect on the
nuclear mission (Department of Defense 2014). The reports revealed an alarming number
of issues in the nuclear enterprise. These issues affected the unit level to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and junior enlisted to senior officers and civilians. Following
the incidents in 2007 and 2008, several reports were published. These reports are the
main data source for this research.
A key issue identified by the reports was the failure of leadership in the nuclear
enterprise. A contributing factor for this failure is the lack of experienced leaders, which
was seen during the institutional shift from bomber generals to fighter generals
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear
Mission 2008). This shift challenged Air Force leadership supporting the nuclear mission
and as a result there was “a generation of Airmen without inspirational leadership that
could motivate an organization to believe in the deterrent value of the nuclear forces.”
(Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012).
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The nuclear enterprise also failed to develop its culture into an operationally
focused environment. The nuclear enterprise was focused on perfect test scores,
inspection preparation, metrics, and quick fixes rather than mission accomplishment and
operational effectiveness (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management
Phase I: The AF’s Nuclear Mission 2008, U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008,
Spencer, Ludin, and Nelson 2012). Inspection and test results were used to reward or
punish, instead of in preparation for mission readiness. As a result, the United States Air
Force (USAF) started to train to inspections and not the mission, whereas the United
States Navy (USN) looked at inspections as way to correct errors and learn from their
mistakes.
After Strategic Air Command (SAC) stood down, no single organization in the
USAF was responsible for the nuclear mission. Since then, several efforts were made to
improve the USAF’s organization to ensure nuclear enterprise initiatives were sustained;
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) stood up, Assistant Chief of Staff for
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10) in Headquarters Air Force (HAF)
was created, and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center focused its attention on the
execution and support of nuclear forces (Department of Defense 2014). Despite these
attempts, the USAF is still struggling to find the right organizational structure to maintain
the nuclear enterprise.
4

The Schlesinger Report stated that after the Cold War ended, both training and
education in the nuclear enterprise were cut back to the point of near elimination
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear
Mission 2008). The lack of training is more noticeable at units that have dual-capable
aircraft (capable of delivering nuclear and conventional munitions). The use of strategic
bombers in conventional missions has highlighted the ascendency of conventional forces
and the declining relevance of the nuclear mission (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012).
When the mission focus shifted to conventional operations, so did the training.

Background
The end of the Cold War (1947-1991) had a profound effect on the nuclear
enterprise and nuclear culture within the military. The U.S. Department of Defense’s
(DoD) nuclear enterprise is comprised of a strategic triad: USAF intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), USAF nuclear bombers, and USN ballistic missile submarines. PostCold War, the nuclear mission went into hibernation as the strategic focus of the nation
shifted to conventional warfare and special operations, which were considered primary to
winning the war on terrorism. With that in mind, in 1992, SAC was replaced by a new
tactical command known as Air Combat Command (ACC). Upon activation of ACC, all
bombers, reconnaissance platforms, battle management resources, and ICBMs were
transferred to ACC. The transfer of all bombers and ICBMs to this new command
5

marked the end of the Air Force’s dedication to the nuclear mission (Schlesinger, Carns,
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). To
emphasize this point, a senior leader commented that the USAF went from doing the
nuclear mission 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, to a “part-time task.” (Department of
Defense 2014). The USAF was not the only service to suffer. In 2013, the USN retired its
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear, leaving them with just one nuclear missile,
Trident II.
Since the beginning of the tactically focused war on terrorism in 2002, the nuclear
enterprise has endured several major incidents. The first incident occurred in 2006, when
classified parts were accidently shipped to Taiwan. According to the report titled “The
Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified
Missile Components: An Assessment”, inexperience and not properly following
procedures led to classified parts being labeled as helicopter batteries, which the Defense
Logistics Agency then shipped to Taiwan (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012). The error
wasn’t discovered until 2007 when the Taiwanese finally opened the crate, and notified
U.S. officials, who promptly recovered the items. During the same year, an unauthorized
movement of six nuclear warheads occurred on a B-52 flight from Minot AFB, ND to
Barksdale AFB, LA. An assessment concluded that throughout the entire transfer, a series
of missed checklist steps, a lack of oversight and experience, and complacency were
6

contributing factors (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012). The most recent incident was in
2014, when USN nuclear reactor operators and USAF nuclear missile crews were caught
cheating during nuclear certification exams. These three major failures in the nuclear
enterprise are not all inclusive, but they were the most significant.

Problem Statement
The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to the nuclear enterprise and
to the global security environment. This led the USAF and USN to restructure their
combat forces, and to focus on tactical, conventional and special operations. In a 2008
report to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), James Schlesinger stated:
Changes made by the Air Force after the Cold War were in response to the
defense downsizing of the 1990s as well as national leadership priorities.
During that time, the Air Force and other services were experiencing
severe resource constraints… With less national emphasis on nuclear
weapons during this period, the Air Force failed to grasp the continued
need to maintain a viable airpower-based nuclear deterrent capability.
Moreover, as the size of the nuclear arsenal was reduced and emphasis
shifted to conventional missions, the Air Force failed to articulate the
continuing value of the nuclear deterrent (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008)
In 1992, the USAF implemented its largest organizational change since its inception,
leading to splitting of the nuclear enterprise from centralized SAC control to the eventual
division of bombers and ICBMs between ACC and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
(U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). In 1995, Base Realignment and Closure
7

reduced the nuclear system resources further, and support organizations were closed and
dispersed, thus adding to the atrophy. As a result, organizations were consolidated and
absorbed the nuclear mission by default. Nuclear proficiency and nuclear-experienced
operators and technicians eroded. The mission focus shifted to perfecting tactical
conventional operations, while limited attention was paid to merely passing nuclear
inspections and testing, although perfect results were still expected. The USAF failed to
keep the nuclear mission ‘operationally current,’ thus forcing it into a ‘care-taker’ status
with little to no modernization or recapitalization. (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force
2008).

Research Purpose
Numerous reports have identified issues within the nuclear enterprise and made
recommendations to remedy them, with mixed implementation results. This research
paper will take an analytical approach to find the key factors in successful
implementation.
To help find the key factors, the following investigative questions will be
addressed:
1) What process is used to get a recommendation implemented?
2) How does the nuclear enterprise define success?
3) How are implementations assessed once they are sustained?

8

Methodology
The methodology used for this research is a combination of case study and CSF
analysis. The CSF method, refined by John F. Rockart in 1979, is used to identify key
areas where ‘things must go right’ for an organization to be successful (Bullen and
Rockart 1981). Once the CSFs have been identified, KPIs are used to continually assess if
the CSFs are being achieved. The CSFs and KPIs all have a development process, which
will be described in later chapters.
The recommendations were organized into four categories, which were predefined
by the reports. Once the recommendations were categorized, they were checked to see if
they were implemented. Once verified, the implementations were assessed through a
survey sent to senior leaders in the nuclear enterprise, and confirmed with objective
reports and articles. This data was compiled to identify key factors in successful reforms
within the nuclear enterprise.

Limitations
A limitation for the research is the classification level of some reports. The USN’s
nuclear incident reports are classified. To keep this research unclassified, it will be
primarily focused on the USAF, since the majority of its reports are unclassified. Another
advantage of using USAF reports, is they provide more detail about implementation
results. It was feasible to obtain enough information to conduct an analysis and make
9

recommendations. Another limitation was gathering the updated status of nuclear
reforms. There is one organization, OSD Cost Assessments and Programs Evaluation
(CAPE), that tracks the status of nuclear reform recommendations. However, most of
their data is classified and For Official Use Only (FOUO). Lastly, AFGSC’s Program
Action Directive is FOUO, so this research does not use specific information from that
document.

10

II. Literature Review
“For 70 years, we have deterred and assured. And while our nation's nuclear
enterprise is safe, secure and effective, we cannot take it for granted any longer.”
-Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command

Chapter Overview
With the end of the Cold War the erosion of the nuclear enterprise started and
several major incidents occurred, which resulted in numerous reports recommending how
to get the nuclear enterprise healthy again. In the late 1990s to the early 2000s, various
nuclear reform reports were written to identify issues in the nuclear enterprise. Although
the reports made recommendations to resolve the issues, these recommendations were
mostly ignored. Between 2001 and 2007 over 235 nuclear deficiencies (almost 100 at
Minot and Barksdale) were reported by ACC (M. Hoffman 2008). Most of the
deficiencies were considered routine and were ignored. In 2007 and 2008 two major
setbacks occurred in the nuclear enterprise. After the first major incident in 2007, a call to
reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise was badly needed, so another round of reports was
written. The reports were derived from DoD’s Task Force committees which were
chaired by a former Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Defense Science Board,
retired generals and admirals with steep nuclear experience, OSD, and Rand Corp. The
findings and recommendations were similar to the previously published reports. This time
11

DoD took the recommendations seriously and the USAF “implemented extraordinary
measures in their nuclear enterprise following two incidents in 2007 and 2008.” (Defense
Science Board 2013).

Nuclear Enterprise
The nuclear enterprise is defined by the 2011 Nuclear Matters Handbook as the
community of people and organizations throughout the federal government responsible
for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapon deterrence (Office of the Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense 2011). To further elaborate on the term, the nuclear enterprise
consists of the people, organizations, processes, procedures, and systems that are used to
conduct, execute, and support nuclear operations and forces (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task
Force 2008).
The nuclear enterprise is important to maintain, because the United States’
strategic deterrence heavily depends on the nuclear triad and all of the agencies and
organizations that help contribute to the mission. Although the nation’s dependence on
nuclear weapons has been reduced, nuclear weapons still remain fundamental to
deterrence. A high level of attention and resources are still necessary to keep this
capability credible. With such a responsibility and destructive power, the DoD’s nuclear
enterprise is always under the scrutiny of Congress and the public eye.
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Leadership
An effective leader creates inspiring visons and ideals to motivate his or her
people. A leader also conveys to their subordinates how they contribute to the mission,
why their work is important, and that they are valued people. In the past two decades
senior leadership lost sight and the decisions they made have had the cumulative effect of
jeopardizing the nuclear enterprise’s deterrent capability. In the USAF, leaders failed to
shift priorities, adjust policies, and maintain the resources needed for a potent nuclear
effectiveness.
In the early 1990s, the decline in nuclear experienced leaders would begin to take
its toll on the nuclear enterprise. Throughout the years the DoD did not identify the issue
and eventually failed to groom the next generation of nuclear experienced leaders. For
example, Air Force Nuclear Task Force stated that some key nuclear billets are not filled
by personnel with nuclear backgrounds; therefore, the billets are filled by personnel with
no prior nuclear experience (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). As the “new”
generation of senior leaders, both civilian and military, filled nuclear positions they often
relied on legacy experience to be successful in the nuclear enterprise (Schlesinger, Carns,
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).
With the issue unnoticed and the focus on conventional missions, this atrophy of
experience would continue to plague DoD for another two decades and become an
13

underlying factor for the numerous nuclear incidents. This issue highlights the need for
USAF leaders to receive formal nuclear training; however, the nuclear mission and
strategy are seldom taught in professional military education (PME). Nuclear experience
is crucial for leaders to reduce the reliance on informal methods of learning and to help
them make effective decisions. Without the nuclear experience or knowledge, senior
leadership in the DoD and the nuclear enterprise cannot effectively convey the
importance of the mission in the U.S. defense policy (Department of Defense 2014).
Recommendations to increase nuclear experience were made by several reports.
One specific recommendation was that the USAF needs to formalize a career
development plan for personnel in the nuclear enterprise and provide them with the depth
and breadth of experience necessary to become effective leaders in the nuclear enterprise
(U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). This recommendation was implemented and a
review of Air Education and Training Command (AETC) courseware was accomplished.
Additional nuclear courses were added to AETC’s courseware and is now introduced
earlier in enlisted and officers PME. Other classes on nuclear matters were created as
well. For example, Nuclear 400 is a course offered by Air University’s
Counterproliferation Center (CPC). This is a two day course that teaches the internal
workings of the nuclear enterprise to O6s, E9s, and General and Flag Officers (USAF
Counterproliferation Center at The Air University 2013). Defense Threat Reduction
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Agency (DTRA) also offers orientation courses in the nuclear enterprise. Their courses
are open for any service member or civilian to attend. These are just two examples of the
courses now offered to educate current and future leaders on the nuclear enterprise.
Another recommendation made was that the commander of AETC should conduct
a review of all Air Force PME curriculum and expand education to include nuclear
deterrence, strategy, and operational theory (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear
Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). After this
recommendation was made, Air University, HAF A1 (manpower, personnel, and
services), and a panel of functional and major command representatives worked in
conjunction to review the PME curriculum. A stair-stepped approach was taken to
revamp the nuclear education system across the continuum of education from basic to
advanced courses (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). The Secretary of Defense’s
Task Force recommended all nuclear matter courses should be offered to all troops,
regardless of rank or service. For example, several Major Commands (MAJCOMs) have
created a nuclear course specific for their training needs. The United States Air Force in
Europe (USAFE) has created Nuclear University, which trains technicians on USAFE
storage and security system (WS3) vaults. Air University’s CPC developed several
nuclear courses for mid-level to upper-level leaders and supervisors involved in the
nuclear mission. Air Force Space Command’s 20th Air Force ICBM Center of
15

Excellence provides training specifically focused on the ICBM mission, which includes
operations, maintenance, and security forces. All of these training initiatives are
important, but they reside in separate MAJCOMs. This makes it difficult to allow cross
pollination of training and to capitalize on any synergy within the nuclear enterprise.
The next issue identified as a leadership failure is the “say-do gap”. The “say-do
gap” sends mixed messages to the troops who execute the mission on a daily basis. The
Independent Review of the DoD Enterprise states senior leadership expresses that the
nuclear mission is top priority and uniquely important, but the nuclear forces experience
shortages in resources, have unqualified personnel, have inadequate facilities, and have
funding shortages. It is difficult to inspire and lead from the front when the nuclear force
hears one thing and perceives another. The “say-do gap” is reinforced with the nuclear
modernization gap between the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states. The U.S. is
stagnant with its nuclear programs, while Russia and China are advancing in their nuclear
programs (Insinna and Parsons 2013).
A recommendation for leadership at all levels is to give the force full commitment
to eliminate the “say-do gap” and increase communication (Department of Defense
2014). This means the leaders must take ownership and responsibility for their actions.
Senior leaders must also consistently emphasize the vital contribution the nuclear mission
makes to the U.S. strategic deterrence (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). An
16

update to these recommendations is AFGSC’s force improvement program (FIP), which
was originally initiated for the ICBM community, but now extends to the bomber
community as well. The FIP team is comprised of operations, maintenance, security
forces, and mission support members from different MAJCOMs and AFGSC wings
(Pampe 2014). The team conducts field surveys, leadership surveys, and collects inputs
from the Airmen executing the day-to-day mission (Pampe 2014). Once the survey
results have been assessed, a list of concerns and recommendations will be presented to
AFGSC and numbered Air Force (NAF) commanders. Since the inception of the FIP, “it
has evolved into a philosophy of continuous assessment and improvement that empowers
Airmen who perform the nuclear mission and seeks to continue changing and improving
the nuclear culture.” (Air Force News Service 2014). One example of this bottom-up
approach, FIP, at work is the ICBM community. The ICBM crewmember’s initial
assignment progression was to spend three years in the unit and then go to a career
broadening tour, which most likely was not nuclear related. It was very unlikely that the
crewmember would return back to the ICBM community. Post FIP, the plan calls for a
“3+3” where the crewmember spends his or her first three years focusing on becoming a
weapon expert in his or her primary job and then the next three years upgrading to
instructor, evaluator, or flight commander. The FIP also identified a need for more midlevel officers in the missile units, so Assistant Director of Operations positions were
17

created to help manage the Airmen. Some other examples of FIP working for the Airmen
are; updated tools and equipment for maintainers and cold weather gear and weapon
improvements for security forces (Department of the Air Force 2015).
The third attribute for leadership failure is risk-aversion. The perception of
relieving commanders as a result of an error or mistake found during a nuclear inspection
or the lapse of judgement of a subordinate has created risk-averse leaders (Department of
Defense 2014). The perception that single mistake can get a wing commander fired, has
increased leadership’s involvement in the inspection process to the point of
micromanagement. The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise states that
there are two main problems with leadership avoiding risk. First, when a leader is riskaverse he or she pushes the authority and decisions up the chain of command, thus
delaying the decision-making process and ultimately undermining his or her own
confidence. The second issue was creating programs to monitor and evaluate. This
initiative undermines confidence, delays work, and devalues the qualification of the
troops performing the mission (Department of Defense 2014). It may initially reduce the
risk of errors or mistakes, but in the long run it is a drain on the already undermanned
nuclear force. Each time there is an error, even the most minuscule, it requires an increase
in monitoring or evaluating, which ultimately takes focus away from the mission
(Department of Defense 2014). “Leaders’ focus on identifying root causes once a single
18

major problem emerges, but do not adequately consider and assess indicators and trends
that provide a holistic view of the force.” (Department of Defense 2014). Risk-averse
cultures tend to avoid risk until the problem becomes a major concern and by then it’s too
late to address or fix. The unauthorized nuclear weapons movement and the classified
parts shipment to Taiwan are two results of what risk-averse leaders cultivated (Spencer,
Ludin and Nelson 2012).
A recommendation made by DoD is to reduce or eliminate risk-averse leadership
styles. The Secretaries of the Armed Forces must provide guidance that the first priority
for MAJCOM commanders is to empower those commanders under them, who execute
the nuclear mission, and convey that there is no place for risk of criticism above the risk
of the mission (Department of Defense 2014). For the MAJCOM level commanders, they
must empower all levels of command to use expertise and judgement to successfully
execute the mission within guidelines and directives (Department of Defense 2014).
Secondly the USAF should not punish for mistakes, but instead allow the leader time to
correct them. The DoD’s Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review recommended to stop firing
leaders and let them learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of their organizations
(Department of Defense 2014). This enforces the ideal that mistakes will happen and it
does not necessarily mean a punishment will ensue. Lastly, to develop a culture of growth
and learning, educate the force as to why leaders are relieved of command.
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A result of risk-averse leaders is the demand for perfection in the troops’
performance. The nuclear mission is unique and it needs to have high standards and
perfection in most aspects, but what the troops perceive are leaders who demand microperfection, known as zero-defect. This zero-defect is expected in every aspect of their
mission from operations to administration (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear
Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). Airmen
were forced to focus on correcting the symptoms of failures, rather than identifying the
root causes and implementing enduring solutions. Based on Admiral Donald’s (the
former Director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion and Deputy Administrator of National
Nuclear Security Administration’s Naval Reactors) investigation this practice led to
informal technical order guidance and straying away from the formal steps and guidance
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear
Mission 2008). The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise also observed
just to reduce the risk of external criticism, that zero-defect is unnecessary (Department
of Defense 2014). For example, in a weapons storage area there is a false assumption that
a 30-year-old weapon will have zero cosmetic defects. To maintain a flawless weapon
like it was new from the factory is not achievable (Defense Science Board 2011). The
practice of perfection should be a goal, but it has become an unrealistic standard that the
commander pushes their troops to meet (Department of Defense 2014). The USAF
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expects perfection all of the time, which drives a culture of excessive preparation, even to
the point where it detracts from the mission, undermines trust, inhibits learning, and
erodes morale (Department of Defense 2014). This practice led the ICBM community to
an unhealthy level of distrust.
The recommendations for leaders who expect 100 percent perfection all the time,
is similar to the recommendations for the risk-averse leader. The Secretaries of the
Armed Forces need to provide guidance, that a high priority for the commanders is to
empower those who work for them, so that they can execute the nuclear mission
effectively and efficiently with zero tolerance (Department of Defense 2014). If an error
or mistake does occur the suggested action is not to punish the individual or unit, but
instead correct it with additional training, hands-on supervision, or provide clearer
guidance (Department of Defense 2014).

Culture
Culture is comprised of beliefs and customs. It is a way of thinking, behaving, or
working in an organization (Gibson, et al. 2012). Leadership fosters culture and can
directly influence it as well (Gibson, et al. 2012). The nuclear enterprise failed to develop
its culture into a thriving environment. It lacked experience, lost focus, fell short on
accountability, and was conditioned to an eroding culture (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).
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During the Cold War, the Joint Staff was adequately staffed with experts on
nuclear operations and nuclear system requirements. By the end of the Cold War, the
nuclear enterprise experienced a rapid decline in mission focus, resources, experience,
and accountability. Significant signs of decline began in 1991. Bombers and ICBMs were
no longer on 24 hours a day and 7 days a week alert status. United States Air Force
nuclear assets transferred from SAC to ACC. The B-1Bs converted from nuclear to
conventional only. Finally the USAF bomber fleet and bases were reduced (United States
Air Force 2008) . The USAF ICBM force went from six wings to three and the ICBM
career field merged with space operations, thus diluting the nuclear experience pool even
further. This atrophy of nuclear experts has gone beyond the missile and bomb wings. It
has a global effect. United States European Command’s nuclear planning staff was not a
priority and it eventually withered to unacceptable levels (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD
Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008).
Other Geographic Combatant Commanders’ nuclear planning capabilities and experts
have essentially been non-existent as well. At Joint Staff the nuclear experts are
becoming extinct, which is a significant disadvantage when it comes to influencing new
nuclear deterrent capabilities, decisions regarding force structure, and participation in
operational nuclear planning process (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). With the loss of the context of the
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Cold War and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, the resulting effect is a lack of
nuclear experts. For example, a job requiring specific nuclear skills may have a person
working in that billet with little to no nuclear experience. This person is not able to
perform his or her duties and their job performance will likely impair or create
inefficiencies in the organization (Dues 2011). As noted earlier in Chapter 1, it was a lack
of experience that contributed the 2007 and 2008 incidents.
Career development was one of the recommendations made to foster a culture of
experienced nuclear personnel and to retain them. To retain nuclear experienced
personnel, the Schlesinger Report recommended to develop a reliable and accessible
system to track nuclear experience across the USAF (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Several years
later, after the recommendation was implemented, the Nuclear Enterprise Human Capital
Committee was created and it is now known as the Nuclear Enterprise Action Committee
(NEAC). Per HAF Mission Directive 1-60, the NEAC is chaired by HAF A10F (strategic
deterrence and nuclear integration, functional authority) and in attendance are nuclear
enterprise career functional managers, Air Force Personnel Center, MAJCOM
representatives, HAF A1, and several other organizations. The NEAC convenes every six
months to discuss strategy on strengthening manning and management of nuclear career
fields (Department of the Air Force 2014). Outside of the meetings, NEAC continually
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tracks human capital challenges, key nuclear billets, and emerging issues. It also ensures
that all nuclear enterprise career fields remain healthy and effective. The former Chief of
Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (HAF A10) stated:
We recently formalized our processes and policies for identifying,
designating, and tracking Key Nuclear Billets (KNBs), select positions of
responsibility within the nuclear enterprise that are vital to its health and
sustainment. KNBs require defined levels of nuclear experience based on
each specific position and are given the highest assignment priority. The
program allows us to more effectively manage the assignment of qualified
personnel to critical nuclear positions, and we rely on a periodic revalidation process to ensure KNBs are aligned to meet the constantly
changing needs of the enterprise. (Department of the Air Force 2014).

During the Cold War years, the inspection process within the nuclear enterprise
provided a steady reminder of how important the mission was and the special attention
the mission attracted. The purpose of inspections are to ensure an organization and its
people are complying with guidance, regulations, and instructions. The Independent
Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise states “inspections are to contribute to the
effectiveness and efficiency of the unit in maintaining daily readiness to perform its
mission.” (Department of Defense 2014). As mistakes and incidents in the nuclear
enterprise became more frequent and severe, so did the number of inspections. As a result
inspections became the priority. After the 2007 and 2008 incidents, inspections increased
to ensure the Airmen were following guidelines and to prevent another incident. The
inspections increased so much that it affected leadership style, mission focus, and troops’
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morale. The non-stop inspections turned training exercises into opportunities for
inspections, thus making training and inspections counterproductive (Defense Science
Board 2011). Any misstep during the inspection was met with increasing inspection
frequency creating a waterfall of ineffectiveness “where an already undermanned and
under-experienced unit is over-worked, over-evaluated, over-drilled, over-observed, and
under-trained—all at the expense of genuine proficiency and mission readiness”
(Department of Defense 2014). The “inspection culture” became the focus for the USAF
and adversely affected the commander’s role, responsibility, authority, and accountability
(Department of Defense 2014). Commanders trained to the inspection and not the
mission, for fear of failing an inspection, which meant the unit was not ready to execute
the mission. For commanders, the possibility of getting fired hinged on the inspection
results. The crew force, perceived scoring 100 percent on exams would increase their
chances of promotion and broaden their career. Anything less than 100 percent meant the
operator was not the best in his or her career field. Being pressured to score a 100 percent
on every exam was one of the reasons why the crew force felt compelled to cheat on
exams (Department of Defense 2014).
In order to break the fear of being fired from inspections, the Secretary of
Defense’s Task Force recommended that the senior leaders must convey that inspections
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are to be used as a teaching tool to identify problems and fix them - not as an excuse to
fire leaders (Department of Defense 2014).
To emphasize the importance and the number of inspections conducted, the
Independent Assessment of the Air Force Enterprise listed ten different inspections and
staff assisted visits (SAVs). Per Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-121, nuclear staff assisted
visit (NSAV) program, is to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, in
maintaining its surety program. It is not an inspection and it is not intended to prepare a
unit to pass a nuclear surety inspection (NSI); however, NSAVs somehow evolved into
inspections, but without the formal grade (Defense Science Board 2011). The Secretary
of Defense’s Task Force recommended that the USAF overhaul its inspection process to
standardize it and to ensure the NSAV program was being used as intended (Schlesinger,
Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission
2008).
The sheer number of inspections for both the USN and USAF was staggering. To
illustrate how inspections became the mission the Independent Review of the DoD
Nuclear Enterprise describes how the “inspection culture” has taken over. The missile
maintenance unit at the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Bangor had ongoing
inspections for five consecutive weeks. The maintenance unit recorded over 100
inspections conducted by outside agencies in within one year. The 91st Missile Wing at
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Minot AFB had a similar experience in 2013. The missile wing had a total of 32 internal
and external inspections within a 100 day period. During that same year a total of 293
leadership days occurred (senior leadership visits to the missile wing), which did not
include an additional 59 ‘visits’ to the wing, ranging from Congressional delegates
(Department of Defense 2014). While both USN and USAF had frequent inspections the
USAF spent significantly more time preparing for inspections, thus reinforcing the
culture of inspections over mission.
Table 1 illustrates the workload and impact the visits and inspections had on
Minot AFB, which has a two nuclear wings.

Table 1: Days of Special Effort at Minot AFB

Year

High Level of
Special EffortMajor
Inspection,
Congressional
Visit

2008
2009
2010 thru Aug

190*
204
168

Significant
Level of
Special EffortMajor Exercise
Higher
Headquarter
Visit
98
192
114

Medium Level
of Special
Effort

Total White
Space
Including
Weekends &
Holidays

72
73
75

69
65
25

* For all categories, there are multiple activities, sometimes three or four on many of the days. (Source: Defense
Science Board, 2011)

Inspections were so constant that the operational and logistics units did not have
enough time nor resources to correct previous write-ups before the next round of
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inspections. The non-stop inspections coupled with exercises had a negative impact on
nuclear bomb wings. The nuclear bomb wings were not able to sustain the maintenance
and inspection schedule, thus decreasing mission readiness (Department of Defense
2014).
To reduce the number of inspections conducted throughout the year, a
recommendation was made to consolidate inspections and to combine inspection teams
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the
DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). The inspection program needs to focus more on areas where
issues persist (quality) and not on how many it can conduct (quantity) (Defense Science
Board 2011). Another recommendation was to have the Joint Staff review DTRA’s
inspections. Defense Threat Reduction agency conducts them on behalf of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services. A review should be conducted to ensure
DTRA is providing the Chairman the appropriate information and if all of the inspections
are necessary (Department of Defense 2014). During a brief to the Senate Armed Service
Committee in 2015, HAF A10 stated it has “initiated efforts to refine the scope and
methodology of our nuclear inspections process, with the goal of reducing duplicative
structures, providing wings with critical “white space” to focus on successful
performance of the mission in lieu of constant preparation for inspections…”
(Department of the Air Force 2015).
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Another issue identified with inspections was that the inspection process was not
standardized and inspectors were not appropriately trained. This led to different practices,
lack of standardization, and unclear evaluation criteria (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Both DTRA
and Air Force Inspection Agency stated that nuclear inspections standards were not well
understood, nor were they applied consistently amongst the major commands
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the
DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). With the uncertainty of what to expect during inspections,
commanders often put a higher emphasis on them and additional resources into preparing
for them.
Several of the reports reviewed recommended to standardize inspections. One of
the methods proposed to standardize was to strengthen the relationship with DTRA by
closing gaps in NSI methodology (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons
Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). An update to this
recommendation is that the AFGSC continually improves and implements its Air Force
Inspection System (AFIS) and integrates inspections with that system (Department of the
Air Force 2015). The AFIS “relies on inspections by the Inspector General (IG) and
assessments and evaluations by functional area managers to ensure that all wings comply
with Air Force Standards…” (Camm, et al. 2013).
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Another issue within the nuclear enterprise culture is the Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP). The PRP is the commander’s program that identifies reliability of personnel
performing nuclear related duties. According to DoD’s regulation 5210.42 and Air Force
Manual 10-3902, the purpose of PRP is “to ensure that each person selected and retained for
performing duties associated with nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control systems
and equipment is emotionally stable and physically capable, and has demonstrated reliability
and professional capability.” (Department of Air Force 2010). Since PRP involves nuclear
personnel and duties, it gets inspected. Inspectors focused intensely on reviewing PRP
medical records (Department of Defense 2014). The pressure of ensuring the records are
perfect with limited resources puts an unnecessary strain on the medical community
(Department of Defense 2014). For instance, a Competent Medical Authority (CMA)
supports several different geographically separated nuclear activities. The CMA verbally
established a policy to accomplish an end-to-end record review of each newly assigned
individual, even if the individual was PRP certified at their previous assignment. With only
one CMA conducting the reviews, the individual’s PRP status could be delayed by several
weeks. The amount of time the individual is not PRP certified is time he or she cannot
accomplish their nuclear related duties, which puts the burden on the unit. To add to this
tedious process, the CMA must place a cover sheet on the outside of the medical folder
annotating any past issues found, no matter how far in the past. This extra precaution is taken
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to avoid criticism by the inspector, but that is not the intent or a requirement in the DoD and
Air Force PRP directive (Department of Defense 2014).
With the onslaught of inspections, additional informal PRP practices developed over
time, complicating and rendering the program burdensome. This ultimately has a negative
impact on the nuclear qualified personnel available to complete the mission. For example, a
unit may be manned at 80 percent. When individuals are seen by an off-base facility they are
automatically suspended from nuclear duties regardless of the type of appointment. After the
appointment is completed, the individuals must be seen by on-base medical personnel. The
individual will be evaluated by the medical team to determine if he or she will remain
suspended or be reinstated for duty. Cumulatively, the individuals who are PRP suspended
could account for 10 percent of unit manning (for a unit which is already undermanned). For
example, security forces and maintenance will have to work extended hours to cover the
missed shifts. This approach does not meet DoD guidance, because automatic suspension
should not occur. The automatic suspension is a result of zero-risk practice in the USAF
(Defense Science Board 2011). The zero-risk approach develops a culture of distrust, and
creates unnecessary work for medical staff, inspectors, and the unit.

Several reports recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), Chief
of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), and commanders at all levels need to provide clear
guidance for the PRP. They must emphasize PRP is a commander’s program used to
ensure individuals are reliable, safe, and capable of accomplishing the mission (Defense
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Science Board 2011). In 2014, the PRP changed to put more trust back in leadership. The
process has been simplified and the individual no longer needs to see the CMA. The
individual still needs to notify the appropriate personnel for off-base appointments, but
now the commanding officer has the flexibility to ask the appropriate questions to
determine if the individual is fit for duty (Mayfield 2014). This puts the trust back into
the commander.
To help reduce manpower in the clinics and eradicate an overly bureaucratic program
it was recommended to eliminate the automatic suspension for off-base visits (Department of
Defense 2014). To accomplish this, a recommendation was made to change the PRP recertification process. The look-back period should be limited to the last certification unless
there is a specific reason for the CMA to look back further (Defense Science Board 2011).
Another recommendation was to keep the individual PRP certified if they were PRP certified
at their previous assignment. This recommendation benefits the gaining unit because the
amount of time the individual is not available for duty is drastically reduced. The Air Force
PRP manual was re-written in 2014 to implement these recommendations; however, the
practice of automatic suspension still exists, because some commanders have always done it
that way (Department of Defense 2014).
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Organization
During the Cold War, SAC was the sole command which responsible for all
ICBMs and nuclear capable bombers. Strategic Air Command’s mission was to deter
nuclear conflict by providing a capable and credible nuclear force (Schlesinger, Carns, et
al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). When
SAC dissolved in 1992, there was no single organization in the USAF who owned the
nuclear mission. Nuclear bombers were under ACC and ICBMs were under AFSPC.
Readiness, performance, and inspections varied between the two MAJCOMs. This ‘new’
structure was not optimized to provide a credible nuclear deterrent. The commitment
needed to sustain the USAF nuclear enterprise decayed in vitality, readiness, and
resources (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).
Several reform reports recommended that one single organization in the USAF
needs to own the nuclear mission. This single organization would also be responsible for
providing nuclear forces to the combatant commanders. This single command would
create a synergistic effort for the USAF. The recommendation was taken to heart and in
2009, AFGSC was activated and inherited all USAF responsibilities related to nuclear
operations. The newly established MAJCOM would streamline the USAF’s nuclear
enterprise to train, organize, and equip the nuclear bomber and ICBM forces. In addition
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to streamlining the nuclear forces, AFGSC provides a clear chain of command for all
USAF nuclear units (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016). Initially the AFGSC
commander was a three star general. This posed a problem since the majority of other
MAJCOM commanders were four star generals. This difference in rank was identified as
an issue. In DoD’s nuclear enterprise review, it was recommended that the AFGSC
commander should be a four-star general (Department of Defense 2014). This
recommendation would benefit the nuclear enterprise because it reinforces the
importance and priority of the nuclear mission (U.S. Air Force 2014). In 2015, the
command billet for AFGSC was changed to a four-star.
Resource limitation was an issue in the nuclear enterprise. For example, Eighth
Air Force, a NAF, was ineptly manned to support the global strike missions. Under ACC
in 1992, responsibilities of the Eighth Air Force included long-range nuclear and
conventional capable bombers, Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
airframes, Air Force Cyber Command, and intelligence organizations. Now under
AFGSC, Eighth Air Force retains the long-range bomber assets while ACC retains
control of the other airframes and organizations (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear
Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Air Force Space
Command also had its challenges within the ICBM crew force. The demand for entrylevel officers at the missile wings was high; however, the demand for mid-level officers
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was low. That equates to after a four year tour, the missile operators could not remain in
their current career field, so they went to space operations. Once the missile operator
went to space operations it was rare for them to return back to the missile operations.
Space operations was expanding and there were more career and promotion
opportunities. As a pure missile operator, promotion and career broadening opportunities
were limited (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). The loss of skilled nuclear missile operators eventually left
a shortfall in mid and senior level positions.
It was recommended that the USAF establish a new organization that oversees
nuclear issues and manages nuclear leaders. In 2008, HAF A10 was established to
provide the necessary focus for the USAF’s nuclear enterprise. Headquarters Air Force
A10 directly reports to the CSAF and is responsible for policy oversight and integration
of all USAF nuclear enterprise activity and issues (Center for Strategic and International
Studies 2008). One of the other responsibilities HAF A10 has is validating, adjudicating,
approving, and publishing the KNB list (see HAFMD 1-60 for additional
responsibilities).
Another organizational issue that burdens the nuclear enterprise is the limited
resources they have to execute the nuclear mission. Plagued with budget cuts and
sequestration, it is difficult to keep units fully manned to sustainable operations. For
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example, one bomb wing reported its crew chief manning was at 67 percent of its
allocated positions, which means there are not enough crew chiefs to support the training
missions (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). The result of the shortfall was that approximately 20
percent of the training sorties were not flown, thus limiting aircrew proficiency and
ultimately reducing combat readiness (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Another resource limitation is
finding parts for the aging nuclear systems. The average age for the ICBM is
approximately 41 years, 50 years for the B-52, 14 years for the B-2, and 28 years for the
Ohio-class submarine (Spring 2011). Finding parts to fix these systems is becoming
nearly impossible, because the systems have out lasted the suppliers.
To help solve the manning issue, recommendations were made for HAF A1 to
define nuclear-critical billets and identify critical nuclear positions as “must fill” on the
unit manning documents (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment
Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). This recommendation was implemented and it
is now the responsibility of HAF A10, as previously discussed. Another manning
recommendation made in the Schlesinger report was simply to end strength drawdowns
of the nuclear force. Currently house lawmakers are advocating to add over 20,000 more
troops to the military force. The bill has made it to the first draft of the annual defense
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authorization bill and looks promising (Shane III 2016). To help sustain the triad fleet
and its components, the supporting equipment should be identified, correctly inventoried,
and sustained until the end of life of the weapon system (Department of Defense 2014). It
was recommended that the part supply process should develop a proactive supply and
contract management systems for out-of-production parts (Department of Defense 2014).
To help remedy the shortage of supplies, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
demonstrated its commitment to the nuclear mission by signing a memorandum of
agreement with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Defense Logistics Agency
has a dedicated weapon system program manager and a weapon system support manager,
which basically help manage the supply chain for the nuclear triad (Moore 2015).

Training
With the emphasis on the conventional mission, nuclear training and education
has diminished. The lack of training is more noticeable at the units that have dual-capable
aircraft (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's
Nuclear Mission 2008). Also nuclear training events at formal training courses were
reduced in order to increase conventional training (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force
2008). For example, at the B-52 formal training unit their syllabus for new B-52 crew
members only included one flight simulator and a sortie devoted to the nuclear mission.
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The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise recommended that senior
leaders review the importance of conventional and nuclear missions and adjust priority as
needed (Department of Defense 2014). The review was accomplished and the DoD
decided to consolidate and integrate five guidance documents into one strategic directive
called Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF provides commanders the
guidance for security cooperation, contingency planning, global posture, global force
management, and nuclear weapon planning (Sweeney 2015). The GEF also allows the
SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to use the assigned forces
in support of combatant commanders to accomplish the mission and to allocate forces
(Air Force Global Strike Command 2014).
If additional training opportunities are added, leaders must ensure it is quality
training. In the Welch and Harvey Report, Sailors and Airmen were interviewed and
asked about the quality of initial training they received. Nearly all of them stated it felt
like the training units are focused on throughput and not on quality (Department of
Defense 2014). Nuclear technicians must complete 3-12 months of training and
certification before they can actually assist with nuclear operations in their units.
Personnel assigned on a four year tour can potentially wait up to 20 months before
entering training because of the lack of instructors, aging equipment, and facility
limitations. All of these factors cause a training backlog (Department of Defense 2014).
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A recommendation suggested the USN and USAF should require a hands-on
demonstration of skills and incorporate heavy computer-based training and evaluations
before graduating to mitigate the hasty throughput and to emphasize quality (Department
of Defense 2014).
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III. Data Collection and Methodology
“To know your future you must know the past.”
-George Santayana
Chapter Overview
To analyze and synthesize the reports, a mixed method approach using a case
study and critical success factors (CSFs) are used. While conducting the case study, it
was clear in some of the reports that the recommendations were separated into four
categories: leadership, culture, organization, and training. For some of the other reports
where it was not as clear, key words were used to help categorize the recommendations.
Within the categories the recommendations are analyzed even further for similarities to
start consolidating like recommendations. This decreased the overall number of
recommendations. Once the recommendation was verified, the CSF methodology was
applied to its implementation. The CSF is part of a five step process that is necessary to
successfully achieve objectives within an organization. Once the implementation is
successful, key performance indicators (KPIs) should be used to continually assess the
objectives being measured.

Data Collection
Data collected for this research began with searching for nuclear reform
recommendations. Initially peer-reviewed articles, Congressional hearings, and reports
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from the entire nuclear enterprise were being collected to find recommendations and
programs implemented. Over one hundred documents were accumulated. These were
narrowed and the focus shifted to the DoD nuclear enterprise reports from 2008 to 2014.
Each report was studied for trends in issues and recommendations. In the nuclear
enterprise and written in an outline format. The recommendations were then transcribed
to an excel spreadsheet for further analysis. As for the articles and hearing transcripts
collected, they were referenced to gather additional information on recommendations.
They were used to validate and update the implementations. Additional assistance and
information was gathered from Headquarters Air Force (HAF) A10, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, OSD CAPE, and Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC).

Case Study
A case study is “qualitative research in which in-depth data are gathered relative
to a single individual, program, or event for the purpose of learning more about an
unknown or poorly understood situation” for a defined period of time (Leedy and Ormrod
2013). The reports published from 2008 to 2014 were in response to the 2007 and 2008
incidents. These reports contain the most current nuclear reform issues and
recommendations published. The reports were analyzed to understand what the key issues
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were, what recommendations were made, and which recommendations were
implemented.
The data for this paper was broad in terms of the number and types of
recommendations, so a ‘sifting’ approach was used. Most of the report recommendations
were entered, excluding unit level and below recommendations since they are not in the
scope of this research, into a spreadsheet. The process to categorize the recommendations
occurred as the recommendations were entered into the spreadsheet. Leadership, culture,
organization, and training are the categories the recommendations were grouped into.
Categories
To organize the recommendations into the following categories, several key words
were identified using the reform reports.
1. Leadership:
a. Key words: leaders, leadership, communicate, commitment, leadership
development, and commanders empower
2. Culture:
a. Key words: culture, inspection, officer or enlisted career development,
trust, zero-defect, perfection, and personal reliability program
3. Organization:
a. Key words: organization, resources, personnel, equipment, organizational
change, need for an organization, key nuclear billets, must-fill nuclear
positions, and critical nuclear positions
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4. Training:
a. Key words: training, education, professional military education, quality
training, robust training, and focus on mission
A comparison of the data was then accomplished to determine which recommendations
were the most common amongst the reports. Another spreadsheet was developed and it
was further divided from categories into subcategories. For example, leadership (L) was
further defined as leadership commitment (L1), leadership development (L2) and so on
(Appendix G). Some recommendations did not ‘naturally’ fall into one of the four
categories, so some interpretation was necessary. Meanwhile, other recommendations fell
into more than one category, so they were placed in all applicable categories.
An additional search was necessary to validate the implementation is still current.
If the recommendation was not implemented then it was removed from the category. The
remaining implemented recommendations were then checked for validity and updates.
The last ‘sift’ to narrow the scope, was the implementation had to impact the wing level
and above. Implementations at the unit level were not reviewed, because they were
outside the scope of the paper.
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Collect
recommendations

Did it make an
impact at the Wing
level or above

Sort
recommendation by
category

Categorize

Yes

Implementation still
exist today?
•Yes
•No

Implemented ?
Yes

•Yes
•No

No

Check for updates &
include it into the
report

Not considered.
Outside the scope of
the paper

Not considered.
Outside the scope of
the paper

Figure 1: Research Paper Recommendation Selection Process

Critical Success Factors
According to Bullen and Rockart, critical success factors (CSFs) are “the limited
number of areas in which satisfactory results will ensure successful competitive
performance for the individual, department or organization. Critical success factors are
the few key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish and for the
manager’s goals to be attained.” (Bullen and Rockart 1981). Another way to explain this
statement is that CSFs describe areas in which an organization must perform extremely
well in order to succeed. Critical success factor is the chosen method used to help answer
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the problem statement. Applying the CSFs will “validate and ensure alignment with the
direction and intent of the organization can enhance any decision, initiative, effort, or
process.” (Caralli 2004).

Define
Scope

Collect
Data

Analyze
Data

Derive
CSFs

Analyze
CSFs

Figure 2: Caralli's Five-Step CSF Method; Source Caralli, 2004

Bullen and Rockart introduced a two-phased interview-method that begins with
an executive’s goals and the underlying CSFs, followed by developing CSF measures.
Rich Caralli, former Carnegie Mellon University instructor, suggested a five-step process
in addition to the two-phased method (Caralli 2004). In Caralli’s five-step method, the
first three steps are integral, because they contribute to the organization’s mission and
objectives. The mission is the overarching vision of the organization. The objectives
support the mission with smaller attainable goals. The first step in the process is to define
the objectives. If the objectives are not already established, then they are developed from
interviews with the senior leaders who can influence or help develop the goals and
objectives (Gates 2010). As the interviews are being conducted documents and
questionnaires are being reviewed at the same time. To elaborate more, the document
review can include performance metrics, organizations’ short-term or long-term plan,
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existing CSFs, or CSFs of peer organizations (Caralli 2004). The purpose of the third step
is to “categorize and analyze the raw data so it can be used to derive CSFs.” (Caralli
2004). One way to analyze the data is to create activity statements from interviews and
document reviews. The activity statements reflect the senior leader’s understanding of
what needs to occur for success. Once the activity statements are defined the supporting
themes are developed, which becomes the foundation for CSFs. At this point of the
process the previous three steps materialize into CSFs. The CSFs are kept short and
concise, otherwise they will lose their meaning and focus (Caralli 2004). The purpose of
CSFs is to pinpoint the activities that are the most important to senior leaders in order to
achieve the mission. Also when deriving CSFs see if two or more can be combined. This
will add more detail and it will reduce the number of CSFs. If there are too many CSFs,
then it becomes difficult to track or focus on what really matters. Finally, the last step in
the process is to analyze CSFs. Since the CSFs are a key element in the success of the
organization, this step is crucial. To ensure the CSFs are correctly identified, they are
compared to the organization’s initiatives using affinity analysis. Affinity analysis is a
method used to study the similarities between two items to understand the relationships
and draw conclusions (Caralli 2004). This analysis is the reason why CSFs are so
powerful.
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Figure 3: Affinity Analysis Example; Source Caralli, 2004

Referencing Figure 3, the enterprise departments determine if they contribute to the
CSFs. Identifying these relationships provides the departments a starting point to define
their goals in support of the CSFs (Caralli 2004).
Critical success factors are the foundation and structure that an organization must
accomplish well to be successful. Once the CSFs have been determined, an organization
must know how it is performing in relation to those factors. This is accomplished by
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using CSFs to develop key performance indicators (KPIs). Key performance indicators
are metrics, both quantitative and qualitative, which illustrate how well an organization is
performing against CSFs (Stapenhurst 2009). There are two levels of KPIs: strategic and
operational. Strategic KPIs are measurements that use a top down approach and
operational KPIs use a bottom up approach. For this research paper the strategic level is
used.

Describe the
end-state result

Develop &
understand
alternative
solutions

Select the
approriate
measure for
each objective

Determine the
delta from past
data points

Set frequency
to review the
data

Figure 4: KPI Development; Source Lorette, 2016

There are five steps in developing KPIs (see Figure 4). The first step in the KPI
process is to reference the organization’s mission. The mission will set the expectation
for success and lay the foundation to develop KPIs. Next, establish the metrics the
organization will need to successfully accomplish the mission. These metrics need to be
specific and applicable to the mission. An example is to reduce the number of ground
vehicle safety accidents by 10 percent. The third step is to establish a data point to
compare progress. The data point is necessary to develop the indicators for future
accomplishments because it uses the data that already occurred or is occurring (Lorette
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2016). Now that the appropriate measure is established, the KPI’s percentage of change
can be determined in each area. At this point, only look at the current numbers and not
the future numbers. Then compare the numbers on different scales, i.e. from the previous
year(s) or previous month(s). Lastly, set the frequency to review the KPIs. Each area will
need to set their own frequency as the requirements will be different. This last step is
critical, as it contributes to the success of the organization and it ensure the KPIs are
updated as necessary.

Recommendation
Approved for
Implementation

Wing Level CSFs

DoD Objectives

Supported

by

MAJCOM CSFs

Drive

Drive

Armed Service
Objectives

Organizational
CSFs

Figure 5: Critical Success Factor Hierarchy

Surveys
A survey is a tool used to collect data from a group or individuals (Alessi and
Martin 2010). The purpose of using a survey for this paper is to gain the insights of senior
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leaders and to assess if they identified certain reform efforts as successful or failures. The
survey questions were based on the recommendations that were implemented and still
operational. To evaluate validity and relevancy, a survey pre-test was completed before
the survey went to the participants (Presser, et al. 2004). The pre-test consisted of sending
the survey to peers with nuclear experience. The Likert scale was used for the
participant’s responses. The Likert scale was developed in 1932 for measuring attitudes
of participants in a series of statements or questions, thus “tapping into their cognitive
and affective components of attitudes.” (McLeod 2008). The Likert scale is based on a
five point continuum: strongly agree (2pts), agree (1pt), disagree (-1pt), strongly disagree
(-2pts), and unknown (0pts) (McLeod 2008).
The survey assessed the senior leaders’ (O-5 to O-10 and civilian equivalents)
perception in each of the armed services to see if there was a consensus that can be
considered a standard. The surveys are completely voluntary and anonymous. The data
will be compared with AFGSC’s FIP interview results to validate the perceptions of
nuclear reform recommendations.
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IV. Analysis and Results
“The optimist thinks this is the best of all possible worlds. The pessimist fears it is
true.”
-J. Robert Oppenheimer

Chapter Overview
This chapter will step through the process from identifying an issue to
implementing KPIs. First, it will step through how the decision is made to implement a
recommendation. Then the five step process of CSFs and KPIs is discussed in detail
using the stand up of AFGSC. Air Force Global Strike command is used as an example,
because there is enough unclassified data to use for this explanation. The second half of
this chapter will discuss the results of this research paper’s survey. As this chapter steps
through the process, the investigative questions in Chapter 1 will be answered. As a
review the investigative questions are listed here:
1) What process is used to get a recommendation implemented?
2) How does the nuclear enterprise define success?
3) How are implementations assessed once they are sustained?
Decision Making Process: (Investigative Question 1)
Following the 2006 classified component shipment to Taiwan and the 2007
unauthorized movement of nuclear warheads, the SECDEF requested James Schlesinger,
to lead a task force to conduct an assessment on the USAF’s nuclear mission
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(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear
Mission 2008). In 2008, Schlesinger’s report was released and one of the significant
issues identified was a “lack of unity of command,” because there was no single
MAJCOM in the USAF that had ‘ownership’ of the nuclear mission (Schlesinger, Carns,
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). At
this point two MAJCOMs, ACC and AFSPC, owned the nuclear mission; however, it was
not their primary focus. Schlesinger’s Task Force made several recommendations from
this observation, but the one that stood out was a need for a single MAJCOM to own the
USAF’s nuclear mission.
Schlesinger’s Task Force then recommended a designation of AFSPC to Air
Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT). The mission of AFSTRAT would be aligned
with the mission of USSTRATCOM and AFSTRAT would provide clear lines of
authority and accountability (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Air Force Strategic Command
never happened, but the takeaway from the recommendation was the need for one
organization to oversee the nuclear mission. In response to the report’s recommendation,
two conferences were convened with senior leaders in attendance (Bleil 2009). The first
meeting, a nuclear summit, was assembled a few days after Schlesinger’s Report was
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released. Less than a month later, at the 2008 CORONA Conference, USAF’s top
generals approved the recommendation for a new MAJCOM (U.S Air Force 2008).
The mission of this new MAJCOM, now known as AFGSC, is to focus on the
nuclear and global strike mission. In the Roadmap for a New Command: Lessons from
Strategic Air Command and Air Combat Command, the author had an interview with
HAF A10 and quoted him stating “We didn’t all agree on how we would quantify that
sense of urgency; but I think the Chief and the Secretary [of the Air Force], by everyone
of their actions - gave a clear indication of where nuclear stood. And that helped
normalize everyone having a common view of the sense of urgency.” (Bleil 2009). The
official announcement for AFGSC was made in October 2008 and it was also released in
Air Force’s nuclear roadmap titled Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. The
roadmap mentions the USAF considered several other alternatives to reinvigorate the
nuclear enterprise, but the stand up of AFGSC was ultimately chosen with the goal to
“increase nuclear mission focus, by placing all ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers into
a single command.” (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). On January 12, 2009 the
USAF officially established AFGSC Provisional (P) at Bolling Air Force Base,
Washington D.C. Air Force Global Strike Provisional had the responsibility to implement
the SECAF’s Program Action Directive (PAD) and the Programming Plan (PPLAN).
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Figure 6: Caralli's Five-Step CSF Method; Source Caralli, 2004

Once AFGSC (P) became operational, the staff could start defining their scope by
using the PAD and PPLAN. According to AFI 10-501 the PAD is “a HAF document that
provides strategic level guidance to HAF staff and MAJCOM commanders about how to
achieve SECAF’s and CSAF’s directed objectives.” (United States Air Force 2015). The
PAD requires detailed cross-MAJCOM planning and guidance to implement USAF
programs (United States Air Force 2015). The PAD also has a broad scope that affects
several organizations and consists of a basic plan and functional staff annexes, which
provides the staff with specific guidance (United States Air Force 2015). Before the PAD
is developed, data is collected and analyzed by the staff. Some of the data points are
turned into action items. If the action items are critical to the success of AFGSC, these
would be further refined as CSFs. Once the CSFs have been determined they will be
analyzed. This is crucial for the success of AFGSC. The analysis involves comparing the
CSFs to the PAD’s objectives. If the CSFs do not encompass the objectives then the
probability of success is decreased (Caralli 2004).
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The PPLAN is a detailed planning document used to implement the PAD. It is
written below the HAF level and it is used to initiate and record major actions (United
States Air Force 2015). The purpose of the PPLAN is to “define required actions and
outlines the responsibilities for achieving a given program directive.” and to activate or
deactivate a unit (United States Air Force 2015). See Figure 7 for an example of an action
item in AFGSC’s PPLAN.

Figure 7: PPLAN Action Item Example; Source AFGSC Programming Plan 09-01
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Program Action Directive (PAD)
The PAD defines the mission statement and responsibilities. These
responsibilities are broad enough to allow flexibility to execute the mission. The PAD
also provides the guidance of how AFGSC will be implemented. Some examples of what
the guidance provides are: how and which assets will be transferred from ACC and
AFSPC to AFGSC, how AFGSC will organize its NAFs, which bases will be assigned to
AFGSC, and what personnel will be allocated to support AFGSC. To ensure the stand up
of AFGSC stays on schedule a milestone chart is provided in the PAD. This chart
includes the action, the office who is responsible for it, the due date, and when the action
was completed. The actions on this chart are considered CSFs, since they have to be
completed before AFGSC is fully operational. These required actions are then separated
by staff functions, both Air Staff and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to ensure each
function knows its responsibility. The required actions also provide the supporting
MAJCOMs guidance of how they will support AFGSC. Lastly, the PAD has an annex
and appendixes that provides additional direction and specific guidance to help support
the stand up of AFGSC.

Surveys
The purpose of the following surveys was to get an insight from senior leaders
and Airmen at operational units. Two surveys were used for this research. The first
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survey, conducted in July 2016, references the issues and recommendations identified in
chapter two. The second survey was accomplished in 2014 by AFGSC FIP Survey
Analysis team.
Some of the survey questions were separated into two rank structures, O-5 to O-6
and O-7 to O-10. The purpose of separating the ranks was to get feedback on squadron,
group, and wing level leadership (O-5 to O-6) and for senior leaders at NAF, MAJCOM,
and Air Staff (O-7 to O-10).

Survey 1: (Investigative Question 2)
Twenty surveys were sent out and 11 were completed for a 55 percent response
rate. A total of twenty-six questions were asked to all of the participants. See Table 2 for
demographics of the participants.
Table 2: Survey 1 Demographics

USAF USN
%

90.9% 9.1%

RANK
O-5 to O-6
O-7 to
or
O-10
equivalent
27.3%

72.7%

Total Years in Nuclear Enterprise
5-10

10-15

15-20

Over 20

18.2%

9.1%

9.1%

63.6%

The questions that reference the ranks of O-5 to O-10 have four bars displayed.
The blue bars represent O-5 to O-6 and the yellow bars represent O-7 to O-10. The
numbers in the graphs represent a scale from -2 to +2. The closer the responses are to +2,
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the more likely they agree with the question. The closer the responses are to -2, the more
likely they disagree with the question.

Strongly Agree = +2
Agree = +1
Neutral = 0
Disagree = -1
Strongly Disagree = -2

The survey was divided into the four categories pre-identified by the reform
reports: leadership, culture, organization, and training. Figure 8 displays the number of
questions asked in each category. Thirty-five percent of the survey questions were
focused on leadership, since this category was identified as a significant factor that led to
the erosion of the nuclear enterprise.

Number of Questions per Category

19% (5)

35% (9)

Leadership

Culture

Organization

Training

15% (4)
31% (8)

Figure 8: Ratio of Survey Questions
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Leadership

1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00

Leadership: Senior leaders (O-5 to O-10) effectively communicate how
important the nuclear mission is
1.67
1.67

0.44

USAF

0.44

USN

USAF

USN

Figure 9: Leadership Question 7&8

Leadership was doing a modest job of communicating the importance of the
nuclear mission. This lack of communication eventually affected the morale of the troops
supporting the nuclear enterprise. One of the common recommendations for this issue
was for leaders to effectively communicate the message. Figure 9 asks how effective the
communication is in the USAF and the USN. The results show the USN is more effective
at communicating than the USAF. The following comments from the survey may help
explain why.
-“Then Navy clearly speaks with one voice and the CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations] has publically stated the foundational nature of
their deterrent force.”
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-“Outside of a small cadre of leaders directly involved in the
nuclear enterprise, USAF leaders tend to ignore this mission set.
My sense is that USN leaders are better at this than the USAF.”
-“In general, there has been an improvement in senior USAF
leaders discussing the importance of the nuclear mission, but it is
intermittent.”
To elaborate more on the first comment, the USN has a Strategic Systems
Program (SSP) which only has the nuclear mission. The Director of SSP is
responsible for all of USN’s nuclear weapons and associated systems, with no
conventional systems. The single mission may contribute to why the USN
communicates more effectively about the nuclear mission.
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2.00

Leadership: The experience base of senior leaders (O-5 to O-10) who
directly supervises or supports the nuclear mission is adequate
1.78
1.44

1.50
1.11
1.00

0.89

0.50
0.00
USAF

USN

USAF

USN

Figure 10: Leadership Question 9&10

Another concern identified by the reform reports, is the lack of nuclear
experienced leaders. Several initiatives to educate and train were implemented to help
leaders increase their nuclear experience and knowledge. The results in Figure 10 show
that the flag officers in the USN are perceived to be more experienced than USAF. One
of the comments from the survey states: “The experience we [assumption is USAF] have
is good but we don't have a deep base - very thin.” (Survey conducted by author 2016). A
retired Naval Surface Warfare Senior Chief states the USN keeps their nuclear officers
and enlisted in the nuclear realm, so they can become steeped with nuclear experience
(Navy Nukes 2014). For example, the current Director of SSP (Vice Admiral Benedict)

61

has completed nine tours within SSP and is very knowledgeable of the USN’s nuclear
enterprise (United States Navy 2015).
Leadership: Senior leaders (O-5 to O-10) are risk-averse, (i.e. avoid risk
rather than manage it)
USN

-0.10

USAF
USN

-0.22

USAF

-0.13
-0.30

0.44

-0.20

-0.10

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

Figure 11: Leadership Question 13&14

Many leaders stopped making risky decisions for the fear of making a mistake
and getting fired. The perception of leaders getting fired for failing an inspection promted
a risk-averse culture. The Creedon-Fanta Report recommended to stop firing leaders for
minor mistakes or errors (Department of Defense 2014). A comment on the survey states:
“Each sub-culture in each of the services handles risk differently. For example in the
nuclear enterprise the bomber culture manages risk and is NOT averse, while the ICBM
community is risk-averse.” (Survey conducted by author 2016).
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The survey participants believe USAF’s O-5s and O-6s are still risk-averse. There
is a lingering mindset or culture that still resonates in the USAF nuclear mission. The
culture is difficult to change and it takes time. When the next generation of USAF leaders
take command, we may see less risk-averse leaders, because they didn’t ‘live’ through
the previous culture.

0.00
-0.10

Leadership: Leaders train to nuclear inspections in lieu of the nuclear
mission
USAF
USN

-0.20
-0.30

-0.30

-0.40
-0.50
-0.60

-0.56
Figure 12: Leadership Question 15

The unit’s mission and priority morphed into training for inspections. As the
number of inspections increased, more emphasis was placed on them. To change the
inspection culture, it was recommended to reduce the number of inspections by
consolidating them. In Figure 12, all of the participants provided their input for both the
USAF and the USN. The majority of the participants did not agree that the leaders train
to inspections. A comment from the survey states: “If the inspections focus on the
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mission, ‘training for the inspection’ does not occur in lieu of the mission. The issue here
is how closely does the inspection measure mission accomplishment? In the past the
Navy did a better job here. Inspection changes post 2014 have addressed this issue.”
(Survey conducted by author 2016).
Culture
The onslaught of inspections had several side-effects, one of them being the zerodefect culture. After the recommendation was made to communicate that leaders will not
get fired for mistakes or errors on inspections, senior leaders communicated that same
message to the nuclear leaders. The survey participants agreed the communication is
effective. Here are two comments from the survey:
- “Inspections are not used for punishments, but of course a failing
grade is an indicator the unit leader isn't where he or she should be.
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it is natural that senior leaders may take action that subordinates
might interpret as punishment.”
-“Inspections are compliance based for NSIs [Nuclear Surety
Inspections] . . . UEIs [Unit Effectiveness Inspections] to a degree
assess compliance but are absolutely what we need.”

15
10

Culture: Nuclear inspections are used for: (select all that apply)

3
9

4

Training (focus on
inadequate or failed areas)

10

Identify shortfalls or trends

5

Promotions

0
USAF

USN

Punishments

Figure 13: Culture Question 16

Figure 13 shows that inspections are no longer being used for promotion or
punishment. Leaders utilize inspections to help identify gaps in their nuclear program(s).
Leadership would often make a statement, but there was no action behind it. This
“say-do gap” is an issue in the nuclear enterprise. In Reinvigorating the Air Force
Nuclear Enterprise, it states “in accordance with the Air Force number one priority to
revitalize the Air Force nuclear enterprise, the Annual Planning and Programming
Guidance (APPG) will reflect minimal risk to the Air Force nuclear enterprise during the
POM [Program Objective Memoranda] process.” (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force
2008). The USAF has stated the nuclear mission is its priority, but the Schlesinger Report
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revealed many Airmen heard the same repeated statement that the nuclear mission is
“number one”; however, many of them were skeptical of it (Schlesinger, Carns, et al.,
DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).

Culture: The following services have the proper
focus on the nuclear mission
10
8
6
4
2
0
Yes

No, but it has improved in the past
5-10 years
USAF

Undecided

USN

Figure 14: Culture Question 22

Figure 14 illustrates that the majority of the survey participants agree that the USN
adheres to its words by making the nuclear mission its focus. On the other hand, the
USAF still lacks the focus on the nuclear mission, but it has improved in the past five
years. One of the recommendations made by the Welch-Harvey Report was to put action
behind the words (Department of Defense 2014). One of the comments from the survey
expands on this recommendation. “This culture was not present in the USN. Nuclear was
a priority. In the AF, this situation has improved but nuclear is still not the first priority.
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In addition, after the SECAF James and Deputy Secretary of Defense Work leave we will
likely lose significant ground here.” (Survey conducted by author 2016). In the past
several years, SECAF has diminished the “say-do gap”. For example, SECAF has visited
every nuclear base, advocated for an increase in the nuclear budget, supported nuclear
weapon system upgrades, and has emphasized the importance of the nuclear mission.
Training
For Figure 15 and 16, high-level civilians are defined as O-5 to O-10 equivalents
and entry to mid-level civilians are O-4 and below equivalents. The survey participants
rated each rank structure in both the USAF and USN.
Training: In USAF, adequate professional military education on
nuclear subjects are made available to:
High-level civilians
Entry to mid-level civilians
O7 to O10
O4 to O6
O1 to O3
E6 to E9
E1 to E5
-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

Figure 15: Training Question 28

Figure 15 illustrates the opportunities for USAF O-4s to O-6s have increased, but
the outlook for the other ranks look rather bleak. One of the suggestions made on the
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survey is: “Courses like Nuclear 100, 200, 300 & 400 are good but insufficient. We need
additional education courses and need to cover a broader section of the AF [and Navy]
(esp civilians)” (Survey conducted by author, 2016).
Training: In the USN, adequate professional military education on
nuclear subjects are made available to:
High-level civilians

Entry to mid-level civilians
O7 to O10
O4 to O6
O1 to O3
E6 to E9
E1 to E5
-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Figure 16: Training Question 29

The results displayed in Figure 16 shows the USN is doing slightly better than the USAF.
To help close the service gap, a suggestion made by one of the participants is to
communicate the courses available to all MAJCOMs and services.
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Training: The focus on nuclear training has declined as a result of the
increased requirements for conventional forces

USN

-0.78

USAF

-1.00

-0.80

-0.60

-0.40

-0.20

0.33

0.00

0.20

Figure 17: Training Question 31

The majority of the participants agree that the USN has not lost focus on the
nuclear mission. One of the reasons why the USN can focus on the nuclear mission is the
SSP, which was mentioned earlier. However, USAF has dual-capable units (B-52, B-2,
F-15, and F-16) that still train for both nuclear and conventional missions. A participant
made an observation stating: “…Tanker training for nuclear mission needs more
emphasis…Nuclear training in the AF is not where it should be, but focus on nuclear
training in the AF is improving.” (Survey conducted by author, 2016).
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0.40

Training: Overall, are you satisfied with the training of personnel in
the nuclear mission?
Undecided

No, but it has improved in the past 3-5 years

No

Yes

USN

USAF

0

1

2

3

4

5

Figure 18: Training Question 32

Question 32, Figure 18, differs from the other survey questions. Since the
response selection is ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘no, but it has improved in the past 3-5 years’, and
‘undecided’ the scale is 1 to 6 compared to the -2 to +2 of the other survey questions. The
number represents the number of votes each response received. For example, there are
four participants who selected yes, training has improved, for the USAF. The response
‘no, but it has improved in the past 3-5 years’, was included to show improvement in the
nuclear enterprise. The majority of responses for the USN is undecided, since the
majority of the participants are in the USAF. For the USAF, a split between ‘yes’ and
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‘…it has improved in the past 3-5 years’ is illustrated. This is a positive perception and
sign for the USAF. One of reasons for the increase could be the additional instructors at
the training units. More instructors were allocated to help alleviate the bottleneck and to
improve the quality of training. The other reason for the increase in training could be
attributed to the decrease in inspections. With less inspections the units can concentrate
on training for the mission and not for inspections.
The next three survey questions are separated into the following section because
the results were unanimous.
Culture Question 22: The following services have the proper focus
on the nuclear mission

USN

USAF

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

Figure 19: Culture Question 22

Responses for the USAF were 70 percent replied no, but it has improved in the
past 5-10 years and 18 percent replied yes; whereas the USN had 91 percent responded
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2.50

yes and 9 percent was undecided. Once again the USN has an overwhelming advantage
over the USAF. Two participants commented on this question.
- “AF - needs Sr-lvl [Senior Level] (3/4-star) buy in (outside of
AFGSC/AF/A10) USN - Needs to embrace outside of Navy
reviews / observations of their inspections”
-“ Creating the HAF/A10 is a positive step to improve the nuclear
mission and, at the same time, a very negative one as it has the
potential to remove authority from others in the pentagon that
should grab nuclear as their number one priority. Therefore, we
have one organization focused on nuclear 24X7 and other
organizations that view the system as such...’CONVENTIONAL’
and ‘nuclear’.”
Suggesting to share the nuclear ‘love’ in the Pentagon would increase awareness
of the mission. Senior leaders and organizations, without the nuclear mission, do
not have much interest in it; however, if the nuclear mission included these senior
leaders and organizations, they may learn how important the nuclear mission is.
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Organization Question 25: A single organization has complete
oversight of DoD's nuclear enterprise

-1.20

-1.00

-0.80

-0.60

-0.40

-0.20

0.00

Figure 20: Organization Question 25

The responses from the participants all agreed that there is no single organization
in DoD that has complete oversight of the nuclear mission. One of the participants
commented that “there is no single oversight of the entire nuclear mission, but
USSTRATCOM has complete command over the operating force.” (Survey conducted by
author, 2016). This question was asked because there was no single organization in the
USAF that oversaw its nuclear enterprise, until AFGSC. Both AFGSC and SSP are the
single organizations, in their respective services, with the nuclear mission. Both are
proven to be successful. Would the nuclear enterprise benefit if the DoD had an
organization that oversaw both USAF’s and USN’s nuclear enterprise? An assumption
may be that the nuclear enterprise is too big for one organization in DoD to care and feed
for it.
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Organization Question 26: The standup of Air Force Global
Strike Command (AFGSC) helped define the Air Force's nuclear
mission/role

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

Figure 21: Organization Question 26

Of the participants there were 9 agrees, 1 disagree and, 1 undecided. No
comment was left for the one disagree, so speculation was suggested. Overall, the senior
leaders state that AFGSC is a success.

Survey 2
The results for this portion of the chapter are from AFGSC’s FIP survey. The
specific questions pulled from the AFGSC’s survey relates to this research. There are
more data points in the AFGSC’s FIP survey available for analysis which can be
retrieved on its SharePoint page at
https://org1.eis.af.mil/sites/afgsc/internal/FIP/default.aspx.
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Air Force Global Strike’s FIP team conducted peer-to-peer interviews and group
discussions to collect their data. For the survey results the 2014 Bomber FIP (BFIP)
quantitative analysis is used. The FIP team interviewed 229 leaders and 4,190 nonleaders. Both categories included enlisted and officer ranks (AFGSC BFIP slides 2-3,
2014). There is no data in the survey that defines leader and non-leaders. The FIP team
further divided their survey into five groups: mission support and medical, maintenance,
operations, operations support, and security forces.
The FIP team asked if leaders have the qualifications and experience to make the
correct decisions in the nuclear enterprise. The average response from the five groups
was 48 percent concurrence, with the highest from the operational support at 60 percent
and the lowest from maintenance at 41 percent (AFGSC BFIP slide 4, 2014). These
results are comparable to the senior leaders that were surveyed. There is not a resounding
agreement from the research’s survey and the FIP interview, but there is a positive
perception that leadership’s experience and qualifications are improving.
The FIP team also inquired if the training requirements and programs adequately
prepare the members of the unit to accomplish their mission (AFGSC BFIP slide 5,
2014). The average response from the five groups was 43 percent concurrence, with the
highest from the operational support at 67 percent and the lowest from security forces at
29 percent. The quality of training still needs to improve at all levels in the nuclear
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enterprise. Once again this perception from the unit level coincides with the senior
leaders that were surveyed.
Perception is an example of how an implementation is considered to be
successful. The expectation effect can explain the reasoning behind this. The expectation
effect is “ways in which expectations affect perception and behavior. Generally, when
people are aware of a probable or desired outcome, their perception and behavior are
affected in some way.” (Lidwell, Holden and Butler 2003). A few examples of
expectation effect are Halo Effect, Hawthorne Effect, Pygmalion Effect, Placebo Effect,
and Rosenthal Effect (Lidwell, Holden and Butler 2003). If senior leaders desire a
successful outcome, more effort will be exerted in the implementation. Senior leaders
may increase communication on the implemented program and publicize how successful
it is. The same perception is now echoed from MAJCOM to unit level organizations. In
the opinion of this researcher, this is one of the reasons why communication is vital in the
nuclear enterprise.

Assessment: (Investigative Question 3)
Using the steps outlined in the previous chapter, KPIs are used to help
organizations measure their goals or objectives. In the PAD and PPLAN for AFGSC the
end-state was defined. Air Force Global Strike Command can build upon those end-state
objectives, since that is the foundation of why AFGSC was stood up. Using strategic KPI,
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a top down approach is used. The vision of AFGSC is developed by senior leaders and is
defined as “Innovative leaders providing safe, secure and effective combat-ready forces
for nuclear and conventional global strike…today and tomorrow!” (Air Force Global
Strike Command 2016). The strategic plan that supports the vision is “…establishing the
impetus for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.” (Air Force Global Strike
Command 2016). Air Force Global Strike Command has three objectives: mission,
airmen, and families. This report will use mission as the objective to continue to
demonstrate KPIs. Within the mission there are several sub-areas defined to meet the
main objective. One sub-area is “focus training to achieve and exceed standards.” (Air
Force Global Strike Command 2016). At this point leadership needs to identify the CSFs.
A question to ask is, what is the standard for training? Does AFGSC compare its training
standards with the other MAJCOMs? Air Force Global Strike Command’s strategic plan
defines two CSFs, which are referred to as measures of success. One of the CSFs AFGSC
identifies is “Training requirements accomplished to a sufficient level to meet readiness
requirements in accordance with OPLAN [Operations Plan] and AEF [Air & Space
Expeditionary Force] taskings or as directed.” (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016).
Now that a CSF for AFGSC is identified the KPI can be defined. Air Force Global Strike
Command’s Strategic Plan has two KPIs defined, but refers to them as metrics. One of
the KPIs identified is “Sufficient number of CMR [Combat Mission Ready] crews
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remain current on ground training events impacting CMR status in order to fulfill
OPLAN and AEF taskings when executed as well as Designed Operational Capability
statements (A3, NAF, Wing) [A3].” (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016). This KPI
does not define a specific number of crews, because it is a classified number. This KPI
identifies the number of crews needed, mandatory training events, and specifically what
ground items affect CMR. If one of the areas falls below the specified number, then
AFGSC has failed in its objective. If this trend would occur in all of AFGSC’s units, then
AFGSC would fail on a larger scale. Continued failures may lead to other
recommendations or actions enforced by senior leaders. An extreme example of a
continued failure in the USAF’s nuclear mission could be to stand up an organization like
USN’s SSP, where the nuclear mission is the only mission. Key performance indicators
are used to continually assess the CSFs to ensure AFGSC remains successful.
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“I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the conclusion is false.
The hundredth time I am right.”
-Albert Einstein
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
Research and analysis conducted in this study provide the foundation for final
observations and recommendations. Research highlighted several challenges; however,
the overall research questions were answered. Assessment of data gathered and analyzed
identified shortcomings associated with the implementation of changes within the nuclear
enterprise. Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter is to provide senior leaders with
recommendations to enable continued success of the nuclear enterprise.

Conclusions
Researching and synthesizing the nuclear reform reports was a vigorous, but
humbling experience. Yet it served as a reminder of the strategic importance of the
nuclear mission and how critical the Airmen, Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, and supporting
organizations are to the nuclear enterprise. With that being said, it is a double edged
sword. The same people who do their best to train, execute, and support the nuclear
mission are equally capable of crippling it. The success of the nuclear enterprise is
greatly attributed to those who unashamedly advocate for it. Top leaders (e.g. Secretary
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of the Air Force and Secretary of Defense) consistently show their support by putting
actions behind their words. Their support adds credibility to our senior leaders and to the
nuclear enterprise.
The CSF methodology was the best process identified for this study. Chapter
three highlighted AFGSC as a very successful implementation. Air Force Global Strike
Command is not the typical case analyzed in this study, because it was event driven by
the 2007 and 2008 events instead of a process improvement. Nevertheless, it serves as an
excellent example to explain a successful implementation. If the process of creating
AFGSC can be documented in a formal manner, those same principles should easily
apply to the processes on a much smaller scale.
The goal of this study was to discover a process that was successful from the
initial identification as an issue to Full Operational Capability (FOC) status. This proved
to be unattainable since the initial identification is determined by a very senior group of
leaders convening at a conference recognizing an issue. The issue then requires the senior
leaders to reach a majority and agree on a decision. Without this decision,
recommendations will never be considered. Information on the actual process within
those senior leader conferences was not available for this study; therefore, a true
beginning-to-end process analysis was not possible. However, process analysis was
possible once recommendations were implemented.
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Initially when this research paper was in the inception stage, the investigative
questions were looking in the wrong areas. For example, investigative question one (IQ1)
was; why are some recommendations implemented and others are not? As the research
progressed, there was no concrete solution to this question. Investigative question one
then changed to; what factors contribute to a successful implementation? Once again this
was an unachievable question to answer. As the paper matured the questions evolved to
reflect what the paper was really researching. The final IQ1 evolved into; what process is
used to get a recommendation implemented? The question is still not answered, because
once again there is no magic formula or set standard to answer the question. What was
answered is, what process is necessary to ensure an implementation is successful? The
answer is CSFs and KPIs, which occur after a recommendation is implemented. With that
being said, there is no groundbreaking discovery of what makes a recommendation
successful, the main outcome was just finding a process that increases success of an
implementation.

Significance of Research
Several papers describe how to develop CSFs for commercial organizations, but
none of the papers describe how to apply the process to the DoD’s nuclear enterprise.
This report provides a formal process to successfully implement recommendations and
how to continually assess the implementation when it becomes FOC. Secondly, this
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research tracked the current status of implementations, a task that many organizations do
not undertake. For example, former SECAF Donley stated that the Nuclear Enterprise
Advisory Panel (NEAP) would track the development of nuclear leaders with HAF/A10
serving as the chair. However, information pertaining to the NEAP was absent; therefore,
it appeared the implementation failed. In actuality, the NEAP was replaced by Nuclear
Enterprise Senior Steering Group, which subsequently dissolved. Ultimately, the NEAC
replaced both groups and is currently the agency who tracks and manages nuclear
enterprise leaders. Consequently, in order for some implementations to be successful,
they have to be modified during deployment in order to achieve the objectives. Lastly,
this study’s survey garnered several comments from senior leaders that reiterated why
there are still problems in the nuclear enterprise. These comments were included in
chapter four to gain exposure.

Recommendations for Action
Using the survey for this research and AFGSC’s interviews, a comparison study
was conducted on the commonalities in the comments. The following recommendations
came from that comparision.
Recommendation 1
The lack of nuclear education in the nuclear enterprise is identified in several
reports. Even though some of the recommendations have been implemented, the
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initiatives still missed the mark. Some of the survey comments state the scope of
education is too broad while others have stated it as too narrow. There are several
organizations that offer nuclear enterprise education; however, a major problem observed
is the lack of collaboration between all of the organizations. The recommendation is that
all of the organizations collaborate on courses they offer and develop a degree type
program, thereby creating a nuclear university that any service member or civilian
personnel can attend. The program should create three different levels (novice,
intermediate, advanced) and offer classes at each level. As a student progresses through
each level, they will become more immersed in nuclear experience as the studies become
more in-depth. The first level would comprise the basic nuclear enterprise courses for a
broad familiarization. The second level would require students to grasp concepts such as
deterrence and assurance, space and cyber operations, and nuclear weapons orientation.
The third level would consist of courses like nuclear policy, strategy, and international
relationships. The degree or certificate program would also require a minimum number of
electives in each level to be accomplished. This university offers the student the
flexibility and focus necessary to add value to their organization or career. This university
does not have to be centrally located. The schoolhouses can remain regional, i.e. in their
current locations, because each location would have something unique to offer. This
university should also include the national labs (Sandia, Livermore, Los Alamos, etc.)
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due to their resources and classes they offer. For example, Sandia has several classes that
its weapon intern program students attend. The nuclear university should allow all
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy employees the
opportunity to attend as well. This effort to include the national laboratories and other
organizations will boost collaboration and strengthen the nuclear community.
Recommendation 2
The results of the survey for this research suggested that the USN outperformed
the USAF in most categories. The reports reviewed for this research paper have also
suggested that the USN’s SSP has the right mindset and organizational structure for the
nuclear enterprise. One observation was that the USN has a single voice for their nuclear
mission: the Director of SSP. The Director of SSP is a flag officer who is steeped in the
nuclear enterprise, highly qualified, and solely focused on the nuclear mission. The single
mission for SSP has allowed the USN to excel in almost every aspect. My
recommendation is to commit the necessary aircraft and crews at a B-52 wing and at a B2 wing to the nuclear mission. This will allow the wings or squadrons to be focused on
the nuclear mission. Going back to a SAC type of mentality will help increase the quality
and experience of the Airmen supporting the mission. The maintainers and crews from
the conventional missions should be allowed to transfer into the nuclear units. This will
bring a diversity of thought to the nuclear culture. This diversity will enable the nuclear
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mission to thrive by incorporating different points of view and improved processes. The
Airmen committed to the mission should remain in the nuclear enterprise to maintain and
increase their experience. These Airmen will develop into the nuclear experts and leaders
that the USAF desperately needs. Secondly, having bomber squadrons dedicated to the
nuclear mission will increase the U.S.’s nuclear posture by facilitating a hybrid warfare.
A hybrid warfare blends conventional, nuclear, cyber, and irregular warfare, which
exploits the ‘full-spectrum’ of threats (F. G. Hoffman 2009). A suggestion for a future
research paper is to explore the value of hybrid warfare to the nuclear enterprise.

Summary
In the past two decades the nuclear enterprise has slowly eroded. Every issue, big
or small, has taken its toll on leadership, the culture, organizations, and training. It
appears all of the issues were swept under the rug to hide the symptoms. The two major
incidents in 2007 and 2008 raised a red flag. The nuclear enterprise was now being
noticed, but not for positive accolades. Several reports on the nuclear enterprise were
published and hundreds of recommendations were made. One of the more well-known
successful recommendations is the creation of AFGSC. This case was used in the
research to describe the process from the beginning to present day. This example was
used because the documents were made available for public release and there were
sufficient sources that documented the process. In chapter four surveys and interviews
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were used to add depth to the research. The surveys, interviews, and recommendations
were then synthesized to compare results. In order to reduce bias, senior leaders, midlevel commanders, supervisors, and subordinates were included. The analysis suggested
that regardless of rank or position was, comments and perceptions were similar. Finally,
recommendations were made to help improve the nuclear enterprise. Using the methods
and process described in this paper will help ensure the success of future
implementations.
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Appendix A: DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The Air Force’s Nuclear
Mission

LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
LC
O
O
O

KEY: L = Leadership; C=Culture; O=Organization; T=Training
DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission
(2008)
AF provides periodic reports on improving nuclear weapons management
Review nuclear related instructions; ensure current, consistent, sufficient
IG involvement in the process of developing Op and procedural guidelines for
nuclear-related inspections
Policy for frequency and min acceptable levels of participation and designate
central waiver authority for nuclear ex
AFIG spearhead the overhaul and standardization of nuclear inspection process
CSAF establish guidance for conduct of SAVs and ensure it is properly sourced
and staffed w/experts
SECAF provide resources necessary for initiatives required to upgrade/revitalize
the nuclear msn
AF/A1 define nuclear-critical billets and ID critical nuclear positions
AF/A1 establish manpower standards for all career fields support nuclear mission
AF/A1 Airman assigned to key ops unit nuclear billet should be "deployed in
place"
AF/A give the CC option to reclama voluntary deployment requests
SECAF provide guidance to successive promotion and special selection boards;
need to promote nuclear Amn
AF/A1 authorize intel officers to each of the missile wings and to HQ 20AF
AETC conduct a curriculum review of PME to include nuclear matters subjects
Conduct more small-scale wargames aimed at shaping internal attitudes on
nuclear weapons
Est school for nuclear ops focused on professional excellence in deterrence
missions
CSAF establish senior mentor program for nuclear ops
Redesignate AFSPC to AFSTRAT
SECAF and CSAF direct the assign of all AF bombers in 8AF
SECAF and CSAF direct removal of all non-bomber related missions from 8th
AF
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O
O
O
O
O
O
O

Reassignment of 8AF from ACC to AFSTRAT
Review and validation of manning and resourcing of AFSTRAT HQ, ACC HQ,
ICBM/Bomber NAFs, Wings
Review NAF grade structure to ensure equitable w/other NAFs
Designate AFMC CC as Executive Agent for AF nuclear weapons and related
material
Strengthen Air Staff oversight and policy function by adding 1-star billet to
AF/A3/5N
AF/A4/A7 develop guidance to create category of assets encompasses sensitive
nuclear delivery system
ICBM expertise should be required when filling senior leadership within 526th
ICMB Group
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Appendix B: DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD
Nuclear Mission
DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear
Mission (2008)
C
DTRA to seize DNSIs and only conduct Service Proficiency Evaluations
Develop specific guidance for evaluating PRP for units not subject to
C
inspection
O
SECDEF reduce the number of missions assigned to USSTRATCOM
AF/A1 and A10 develop policy to ensure personnel assigned to nuclear
O
units remain on station for a min period
All USAF Weapons grads in dual role demonstrate same level of prof in
T
nuclear weapons employment as the conv msn
O
Designate flag-level officer on Joint Staff, sole focus on the nuclear msn
Joint Staff update joint nuclear ops doctrine and develop nuclear deterrence
O
joint ops concept
Joint Staff sponsor senior-level exercises on three levels; military,
O
military/OSD, whole of gov't
Expand responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon Council to include issues
involving the full range of nuclear capabilities, including weapons, delivery
O
systems, infrastructure, policy implementation, and resources
Nuclear Weapon Council develop and maintain a nuclear capabilities
roadmap for the modernization and sustainment of the nuclear deterrent
O
force (deterrence policy, forces, and infrastructure)
Validate operational requirements for providing capabilities to include
modernizing or replacing the capabilities now provided by Dual-Capable
O
Aircraft, ALCM, and TLAM-N
Establish a requirement for biennial self-assessment of the Nay nuclear
C
weapons enterprise
Expand role of the Director of SSP as the single authority for nuclear
weapons programs and operations, and elevate the position of the SSP to a
LO
three-star billet
Direct a nuclear weapon enterprise manning and experience study to
C
examine the shrinking experience base (NAVY)
Review and expand professional military education curricula on concepts of
T
nuclear deterrence, strategy, planning, and operational theory (NAVY)
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T

O
O
O
T
O
L

O
O

O

T

O
T

Require a greater number of Naval officers to complete appropriate
educational programs to sustain expertise required to support leadership and
staff billets in deterrence policy and strategy positions as well as nuclear
ops and technical matter
Implement the proposals for additional manpower billets required to restore
SSBN squadrons and submarine groups, including the reestablishment of
the group commander positions and full staffs on both coasts
Review TACAMO wing manning and billet funding status to ensure the
wings are appropriately manned at 100 percent of “wartime” levels
Review SSP civilian and military manning and provide sufficient resources
for proper oversight in light of additional missions
Fully resource all support elements for the TACAMO mission, including
trainers and mobile reconstitution capability equipment
Reduce the number of missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, limiting them
primarily to the deterrence, global strike, and space missions
USSTRATCOM, if at all possible, should be filled with a general or flag
officer with significant operational nuclear experience
Institutionalize the role of USSTRATCOM as the lead combatant command
advocating for capability development, requirements, and resources for both
strategic and theater nuclear systems
USEUCOM staff with nuclear weapons responsibilities should be fully
manned with nuclear-experienced personnel
The Secretary of the Air Force should direct that USAFE retain control of
the Weapons Storage Security Systems (WS3) in Europe rather than
placing them under control of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
Direct the Air Force Education and Training Command to train all aircrew
that will be assigned to DCA to be fully qualified in nuclear operations
upon completion of initial qualification
Designate a flag-level officer on the Joint Staff whose sole focus is the
nuclear mission. Staffing and resourcing for the Joint Staff functions of
nuclear strategy, plans, policies, exercises, and analysis should be increased
The Joint Staff should sponsor senior level exercises on three levels: within
the military, military/OSD, and whole of government
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APPENDIX C: DoD Defense Science Board Independent Assessment of the Air
Force Nuclear Enterprise

L
L
L
L

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
O
O
O
O
O

Defense Science Board: Independent Review of AF Nuclear Enterprise
(2011)
AF leadership should maintain realistic expectations regarding state of acct
for NWRM
Needs of the nuclear enterprise to sustain the force are given priority
Funding and program authorize to logistics essential to nuclear deterrence
msn commensurate w/priority of nuclear deterrence msn
Urgent attention to 40+ warhead and missile mx support and test equip
Assign all base-level ops and logistics function to strategic missile and bomb
wings thru NAF to AFGSC
Intense inspections regime is sharply refocused on areas of continuing
concern rather than serving as substitute chain of CC
Normal inspections schedule, single NSI each 18mo and NORI each 18 mo.
DNSIs as needed
Follow-up re-inspections and special inspections conducted only to address
unsatisfactory ratings or sign negative trends
Provide qualified people to operating forces in career fields that are both
fragile and critical to nuclear msn
Immediate adjustment to AF guidance/practices to remove PRP-based
restrictions and monitoring
Reexamination of the continued utility of set of special HQ org
# of inspectors from multiple org is tailored to the size and complexity
A1 direct a zero-base assessment of the logistics center and op unit
engineering and mx manpower requirement of aging equipment
Public relations and promotional messages include nuclear forces portraying
AF msn and focus
CC at all levels frequently reinforce the primacy of the nuclear deterrence
msn w/communication HQ, MAJCOM, and nuclear forces
AFGSC CC moving adhoc approach to meet the nuclear bomber commitment
to a formal program
Trust technicians judgement vs risk avoidance on cosmetic defects w/tech
data and training program judgement
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O
O
O
O

Provide on-site engineering support until processes are in place to separate
cosmetic defects
USAFE A3 provide clarity on elements of DCA that require continuous
readiness
Id disconnects between NATO and USAF directives
AFGSC complete ongoing work to supplement AFIs as needed to provide
clear direction for nuclear weapons ops
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APPENDIX D: DoD Defense Science Board Air Force Nuclear Enterprise FollowOn Review
Defense Science Board: AF Nuclear Enterprise Follow-On Review(2013)
Establish quarterly newsletter informing the operational forces of
completed actions and plans underway to support equip and other logistics
L
needs, changes in policy, and resource updates
Include media appropriate to the intended audience to continuously update
L
information relevant to the concerns of the workforce
Dep Assistant SEDEF for Nuclear Matters should lead an effort to eliminate
the non-productive workload and unnecessary handling of nuclear
O
components
Direct full funding of development of publication of changes, updates, and
T
rewrite of Technical Orders support nuclear operations
Ensure revised Technical Orders are vetted by hands-on experts before
T
publication
AFGSC CC should ensure the supply specialists provide to the wings for
the purpose of helping establish special supply levels to deal with nuclear
O
systems
Give high priority to the development of a weapons training facility for
T
cruise missile launcher training at Minot
AFGSC and HAF/A1 should create and implement a manning standard that
addresses the unique characteristics of a missile wing operating over
O
thousands of square miles
Review and update DoD 5210.42R to provide clarity in baseline
requirement assuring that the PRP is implemented as a CC's program w/
clear accountability for determining the fitness for duty of people subject to
CO
the PRP
HAF A1 establish a procedure to ensure when assigning personnel to PRP
OT
positions there is an early termination to personnel who do not qualify
The Commanders, AFGSC and Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA)
should strongly enforce the concept that the wing commander is responsible
for a self-inspection program that ensures that the commander knows the
mission and compliance status of wing capabilities and an important
function of the inspection team is to validate or identify discrepancies
LO
relevant to the wing commander’s assessment
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O

LO

HAF A1 in coordination with the AFIA should assess the additional
manpower needs for an effective self-inspection program
The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should clearly declare
the primacy of the authority of the mission chain-of-command accountable
for the performance of the mission and the priority accorded the mission
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APPENDIX E: Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise
Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise (2014) WELCHHARVEY REPORT
Direct quarterly meetings w/ leadership on progress toward complying w/
L
the SECDEF's direction on various corrective actions.
On a regular and sustained basis, make it clear to all of the DOD that
L
nuclear forces remain an essential underpinning of U.S. national security.
Est & support programs that maintain high awareness of verbal & written
public declarations that question the need for nuclear forces and respond
L
with equally public declarations.
Direct that the loosely federated nuclear activities within OSD and the Air
Force be brought together into a coherent and synchronized structure that
O
focuses on direction and support for the nuclear forces
Establish that the nuclear mission has first priority and that the priority is to
L
be reflected in personnel, logistics, and funding support
Direct that the Services address, in detail, the disconnects between
expectations of meeting mission demands and the obstacles to meeting
those expectations imposed by micromanagement, distracting emphasis on
preparing for inspections, inefficiencies introduced by multiple directions
from multiple sources—technical orders, instructions, higher headquarters
directives, manuals—and the plethora of requirements that do not
LC
contribute directly to the mission
Direct the operational chain of command to filter non-mission direction
C
instead of adding to the excess load on the mission forces
Direct that manning assessments address, in detail, the disconnect between
available manning qualified to perform mission tasks and the total workload
imposed by the mission and by issues addressed in the preceding
CT
recommendation
Direct that the most basic needs for Sailors and Airmen and their families
receive priority attention—repairing broken equipment, adequate clothing
for cold-weather conditions, vehicle maintenance, and providing support
services (e.g., childcare center hours, commissary hours, fitness center
LC
hours, medical services)

C

Direct that in addition to attention to the performance of the unit, inspection
teams evaluate and report on the quality of higher headquarters’ support for
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the unit’s mission accomplishment and on those processes, procedures, and
practices that are obstacles to mission performance

LC
LC

LC
LC

OE

LC

LC

O
LC
LC
C

Bluntly and openly acknowledge the problems that have continued to
develop since additional focus was placed on the nuclear enterprise in 20072008
Clearly and forcefully, give the force your personal commitment to closing
the current institutional “say-do gap.”
Direct a move from a culture of micromanagement by commanders and
supervisors to a culture of empowerment of qualified people to do their
critical work
Hold senior leaders accountable for the required actions to assure both the
confidence of the force and confidence in the force
Make it clear to all that individual behavior is a matter of personal
responsibility and that failure to meet performance and behavior norms is a
military discipline issue to be addressed by commanders
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should
ensure that the Director, Naval Reactors provides an in-depth report on
actions to address the broader organizational, cultural, and institutional
leadership issues contributing to the cheating incident at the Nuclear
Training Unit (Prototype) and cheating incidents that have occurred
elsewhere in the Fleet
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
(CSAF) should ensure that training and skill testing is focused on
measuring whether the Sailor or Airman’s knowledge is necessary and
sufficient for the mission, but does not devolve into a counterproductive
continuous demand for higher grades
Initiate a program to enhance recognition and reward for ICBM duty
Direct that, on a continuing basis, officers completing their initial missile
combat crew assignment, in excess of those needed for extended 13N duty
specify three choices of follow on career paths with assurance of selection
for one of the three
Consider special pay for personnel who regularly perform duty deployed
from the home base to the missile field
Increase field grade presence in ICBM operational squadrons
Return full authority to the Missile Combat Crew Commander for execution
of the specified duties of the Combat Crew
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O

O

O

LC

L

LC

C

CT

LC

O
C
C

clarify the roles of the OSD and Joint Staff and realign the structure within
OSD and the Joint Staff to meet the need to synchronize nuclear activities
across DOD to include addressing issues of policy, strategy, mission,
platforms, weapons, and support
create a coherent and specialized nuclear enterprise focus encompassing Air
Force headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, U.S. Air Forces in
Europe, and Air Force Global Strike Command
Ensure that supply chain expertise is integrated into those units (e.g.,
maintenance squadrons) that require the knowledge to effectively and
efficiently work within the supply system to address units’ supply needs
initiate the actions recommended for the Secretary of Defense in Section II
of this report, and be clearly seen by their respective forces to have taken
ownership of the nuclear mission
Provide guidance that the first priority for commanders is to empower those
under their command to perform the nuclear deterrent mission effectively
and efficiently, and there will be no tolerance for practices that place risk of
criticism above risk to the mission
Effective and efficient execution of the mission demands that commanders
and supervisors empower their people by driving decisions down to the
lowest level qualified for the decisions
The preferred corrective action for errors is to correct, not punish, the
Sailor, Airman, or Marine’s performance with additional information,
training, or hands-on supervision appropriate to the situation
Provide the support (to include investment) needed for the men and women
in the force to meet the professional demands of their daily work consistent
with the declared priority of the mission
Empower all levels of command and supervision to use their professional
expertise and judgment to execute the mission within established guidelines
and directives
clearly establish that the A1 community is accountable to the Chief of Staff
and to commanders for forecasting and filling personnel needs with the
functional managers contributing to career development and providing
advice as needed but not direction
Eliminate the requirement for additional agencies to inspect in parallel with
Service inspection teams
Transfer responsibility for oversight inspections of Service inspections from
DTRA to USSTRATCOM and USEUCOM
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C

C

C

C

T
O

O
O

L

O

Require that inspection reports provide useful information to commanders
at all levels on what and how the unit is doing, what the higher headquarters
and support organizations are doing for the unit and, what the structure
outside the unit is doing that makes mission execution more difficult and
more costly to the Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who perform the mission
Differentiate sharply between inspections and assistance visits by ensuring
that assistance visits respond to specific needs identified by the unit
commander, rather than to the higher headquarters staff, and that reports
generated by such visits are for the unit commander to use as the
commander sees fit
direct the Navy and Air Force formal training activities to develop
capability to require a hands-on demonstration of skills before graduation in
addition to heavily computer-based training and testing
Establish and institutionalize across Headquarters Air Force and Air Force
Materiel Command that responding to Air Force Global Strike Command
needs is their highest priority with near-term demonstrations of support that
are immediately visible to the nuclear forces
Significantly strengthen the influence of the Air Force Global Strike
Command in setting and sustaining priorities, ensuring effective followthrough on solutions to needs and issues, and in conveying the importance
of the nuclear deterrent mission
The strongly preferred option to address this issue is to elevate the
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command to a four-star position
If the preferred option is not possible, an alternative is to retain the current
Air Force Global Strike Command structure but create a four-star Air Force
Strategic Command with broad strategic forces responsibility, authority,
and accountability with Air Force Global Strike Command as one of the
subordinate commands
establish that the ICBM Launch Facility and Launch Control Center are
integral parts of the ICBM weapon system
communicate the nuclear investment plans and programs, near-, mid-, and
longer-term to ensure that Sailors, Airmen, and Marines performing the
nuclear mission know what to expect beyond visible progress in support of
field operations
direct that the Services invoke commander’s right to arm authority as the
standard to determine the reliability of nuclear security forces and eliminate
the application of the PRP for nuclear security forces
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OC

O
C

CO

Direct that the inspection teams are to determine that proper PRP processes
and procedures are in place to inform commanders and for commanders to
take appropriate action. Inspectors are not to audit records
Establishing that people qualified under PRP remain qualified with changes
of station until there is an explicit reason to doubt continued qualification.
A new station with new duties or an interval between PRP required
assignments is not such a reason
Establishing that only cause, not the potential for cause is reason for
suspension from PRP
Charging commanders and supervisors, not the PRP monitor and medical
community, with the responsibility to know their people and their issues
that could affect fitness for duty
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APPENDIX F: Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap (2008)

O
OT

Consolidate all nuclear sustainment functions under AFMC/AFNWC.
(OPR):AFMC, create Mission Directive
Establish positive inventory control measures for nuclear weapons-related
materiel.

Enhance Nuclear Inspection processes: establish an AF-wide inspector
training and certification program; implement independent oversight of all
command-level NSIs by SAF/IG; establish a centrally managed core team
of highly experienced NSI inspectors; establish procedures for
OC
adjudicating discrepancies between MAJCOM and oversight teams
Align strategic deterrence/nuclear operations-based education, training,
T
career development and force development activities
Increase nuclear mission focus, by placing all ICBMs and nuclear-capable
bombers into a single command: establish Air Force Global Strike
O
Command
Increase USAF institutional nuclear focus, policy oversight, integration
O
and establish air staff nuclear accountable officer

O

Improve nuclear stewardship in AF corporate processes: Consolidate
nuclear related Program Elements into one panel or a similarly robust
management portfolio; revise Group, Board, Panel and Council structure;
develop a beta-test nuclear enterprise virtual Major Force Program
Create strategic plans that address long-term nuclear
requirements…Cruise Missile; Bomber; DCA; ICBM
Charge the Under Secretary of the Air Force with ongoing broad policy
and oversight responsibilities for nuclear matters

O

The Secretary of the Air Force establishes policy for nuclear matters. The
SECAF and CSAF will jointly chair the Air Force Nuclear Oversight
Board (NOB) which shall meet at least quarterly to resolve outstanding
issues, and specifically to: 1.) oversee implementation of this roadmap,
and report progress to SECDEF and Congress; 2.) review nuclear policies,
standards, performance metrics, and compliance; and 3.) ensure
continuing effective stewardship of the Air Force nuclear enterprise

O
O
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C
LT
O

LT

LC

Rebuild a culture of accountability and rigorous self-assessment dedicated
to high standards of excellence in the Air Force nuclear enterprise
Rebuild nuclear expertise and codify career paths
Construct an end-to-end Air Force nuclear sustainment enterprise system
and revitalize the sustainment community
Develop a comprehensive investment plan committed to meeting the
requirements of the nuclear deterrence mission
Create an environment of sustained advocacy for the nuclear deterrence
mission
Align authorities and responsibilities for nuclear deterrence mission
requirements
Leadership at all levels must make nuclear mission oversight and selfassessment their highest priority
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APPENDIX G: Report Comparison Chart
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questions Results
The following charts were not illustrated in the main research paper, so they are
made available here for a reference.
Leadership Question 11: Nuclear experience is a consideration in
the selection of leadership positions (O-5 to O-6 or civilian
equivalent) with nuclear missions or responsibilities
USN

USAF

Strongly
Agree
0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

Leadership Question 12: Nuclear experience is a consideration in
the selection of leadership positions (O-7 to O-10 or civilian
equivalent) with nuclear missions or responsibilities
USN

USAF

Strongly
Agree
0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80
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1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

Culture Question 17: Inspection rates in the past two years have
USN

USN rates have not changed

USAF
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

Decreased
0.40
0.45

Culture Question 19: The diminishing base of nuclear experience makes it
difficult to select and prepare senior leaders (O-7 to O-10) for command and
supervisory positions

USN

USAF

Strongly
Disagree
-0.50

-0.40

-0.30

-0.20

-0.10

Culture Question 20 is omitted from the report due to the question containing For
Official Use Only information.
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0.00

Culture Question 21: A culture of nuclear "perfection" exists.
(Zero-defect)
USN

USAF

Strongly
Agree
0.37

0.38

0.39

0.40

0.41

0.42

0.43

0.44

0.45

0.46

Culture Question 23: Nuclear inspection results are indicative of
unit capability
USN

USAF

Strongly
Agree
0.00

0.20

0.40
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0.60

0.80

1.00

Organization Question 24: The development of Air Force nuclear leaders will
be discussed through the Nuclear Enterprise Action Committee (NEAC),
chaired by HAF A10F. The NEAC provides sufficient oversight in regards to
future nuclear leaders.

No
-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

Organization Question 27: Organizations, in general, provide a
sufficiently robust experience base to allow placement of the right
people in the right jobs to effectively support the nuclear mission

U
S
N
U
S
A No
F
0.00

Strongly
Yes
Agree
0.20

0.40

0.60
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0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

Training Question 30: The nuclear mission is exercised
frequently/realistically enough to be prepared to execute the
mission
USN

USAF

Strongly
Agree
0.00

0.50

1.00
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1.50

2.00

APPENDIX I: Graduate Research Paper Storyboard
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